Government and Military

Prime Minister,

Tony Blair MP

10 Downing St,

London,

SW1A 2AA

18/3/98

Dear Tony Blair, Ref.: Request for Meeting with Prime Minister to discuss the requests of the Trident Ploughshares 2000 project.

Like all of us who have grown up in the modern era, you know the danger and the threat of nuclear weapons and you undoubtedly share the fear that they will by mischance or stupidity destroy much of modern civilisation and possibly most species on the planet, including the human race. We want evidence that you are moving swiftly to meet the challenge of nuclear weapons in the new millennium, but we see no sign of this.

We are writing to you as the head of the government and because "any decision on use of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons would be taken by the Prime Minister" [Ref. 1], to request a meeting as soon as possible to discuss measures which we believe must now be implemented, in accordance with the views of a large proportion of the British electorate maintained over several decades and the international obligations and legal and humanitarian norms which apply to this country.

The Labour Party’s election manifesto clearly stated your opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and commitment to the goal of "the global elimination of nuclear weapons". Britain’s own actions, as revealed in recent voting records at the United Nations and other international fora, do not appear to be consistent with genuine efforts to achieve this goal. We welcomed the ratification by your government in January 1998 of the two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions but are dismayed that you re-asserted the caveat that "the rules so introduced do not have any effect on, and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons." [Ref. 2]

Our hopes had been raised when the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Robin Cook, stated that your government would be pursuing an ’ethical foreign policy’. Yet on repeated occasions in the following months, spokespeople from both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence have stated their determination to retain nuclear weapons and continue a policy of nuclear ’deterrence’. However, nuclear weapons that threaten mass destruction, are hardly consistent with an ethical foreign policy nor is nuclear ’deterrence’ a feasible or credible defence policy. Because of the policy of nuclear ’deterrence’ developed during the Cold War by the two super-powers, the nuclear arms race mounted to the level where each side had the capacity to annihilate the world many times over. Nuclear war games scenarios are disconnected from any sense of scientific or military reality. It was, and is, reckless proliferation. The retention of nuclear weapons is now being rationalised as a way to combat other weapons of mass destruction. By continuing to embrace this contradictory and dangerous policy the UK gives rise to exactly what it wants to prevent. The British government sends a message round the world that nuclear weapons are somehow necessary for defence and for achieving military and political objectives. We believe there is an urgent requirement to engage in immediate nuclear disarmament. The intellectual argument has been won, the geopolitical climate makes it possible at the moment, and this window of opportunity will be lost if we do not act now.

We also refer you to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which held that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally contrary to international humanitarian law and that states are under an obligation to bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects [Ref. 3]. We further refer you to the decisions taken without a vote by 175 States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995, particularly the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, including the "determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." [Ref. 4]. Britain participated fully in these decisions.

It is the opinion of Trident Ploughshares 2000 and many other global citizen-based organisations that the ICJ effectively delegitimised nuclear deterrence postures. Threats of first use to defend ’vital interests’ in conflicts with non-nuclear weapon states, as well as threats of first use in response to conventional attack by a non-nuclear weapon state would be unlawful. Threats of massive retaliation against nuclear attack are ruled out as well. We are aware of attempts to construct a post-Cold War ’sub-strategic’ mission for Trident but regard such proposed use as mistaken, incoherent and incompatible with international humanitarian law. We believe that the possession of nuclear weapons is also totally incompatible with any common global ethics. Furthermore, we believe that the deployment of Trident misuses resources that should be devoted to the real security challenges facing us in the new millennium: from systemic poverty to widespread environmental degradation, to proliferation and international terrorism, among others. We believe in the power of love and justice to resolve our conflicts. This is not the same as excusing power abuses or allowing atrocities to be inflicted, but it is a recognition that the means we use to solve our conflicts must be consistent with our deepest morality.

Many individuals involved in the Trident Ploughshares 2000 project have written to you about the continued illegality of the Trident nuclear system. They have written throughout the last 10 months since your government was elected to represent us. In almost every response to our concerns, you have replied along the lines that you "do not believe that the Court’s opinion requires a change in the United Kingdom’s entirely defensive nuclear policy" [Ref. 5]. You have also stated, "The government remains confident that its nuclear deterrent posture is entirely consistent with international law." [Ref. 6]. We are most concerned about your interpretation of the Advisory Opinion and your continuing reliance on nuclear weapons. [For an analysis of the key elements of the Court’s Opinion, please see Appendix 1].

In requesting a meeting with you, we also wish to inform you openly and respectfully of the proposed plans and organisation of the Trident Ploughshares 2000 project. We are helping citizens to attempt peaceful, safe and accountable practical disarmament of the British Trident-based nuclear weapons system, in accordance with international law and our responsibilities as global citizens. In the absence of clear commitment by the government to disarm British nuclear weapons and implement a non-nuclear security policy and in view of the urgency of the task, we intend to start carrying out this nonviolent and responsible work on 11 August 1998 at Faslane. We would prefer to engage in dialogue with you in the hope that you will be able to reassure us that we do not need to begin this work ourselves.

After much consideration, we have decided on the following criteria for halting Trident Ploughshares:

Trident Ploughshares 2000 will halt its activities if the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, or Secretary of State for Defence, gives us a written undertaking or makes a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all British nuclear weapons will be disarmed by 1 January 2000 and that the government is committed to implementing a non-nuclear security policy.

We recognise that such an undertaking would be a process consisting both of operational changes, which the government could direct the Ministry of Defence to implement immediately without reference to any other governments or negotiations, and policy changes that will require consultations with foreign suppliers and allies and international negotiations.

Trident Ploughshares 2000 will be prepared to halt our direct activities as long as we are satisfied that genuine progress towards disarming Britain’s nuclear capability is being made, but we will resume if undertakings are reversed or unreasonably drawn out or postponed. We regard the following visible and verifiable elements as indispensable to genuine commitment by the government to a process of de-nuclearising Britain.

i) The British Trident submarine system must immediately be taken off 24-hour patrols. ii) No new Trident missiles are to be purchased from the United States. iii) All British nuclear warheads must be removed from their delivery systems and stored separately by 1 January 2000. iv) No further deployment of US nuclear weapons in Britain. Britain should work with its NATO allies for withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and for establishment of a policy not to use nuclear weapons first or against non-nuclear-armed adversaries in any circumstances. v) Trident missiles are to be returned to the United States and the warheads to be returned to AWE Aldermaston/Burghfield by an agreed date. vi) Commitment to a timetable for the decommissioning of British nuclear weapons as fast as is feasible and safe, with a target date for completion of 2010 at the latest. vii) Pledge not to replace Trident or seek to acquire nuclear weapons again. viii) Conversion of Britain’s nuclear weapon facilities from research and development for the maintenance and production of the nuclear arsenal towards the decommissioning of nuclear weapons and facilities, safe management and disposal of nuclear materials under strict and effective national and international safeguards and controls, and the enhanced verification of international agreements on weapons of mass destruction. ix) Active and constructive British involvement in the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the goal of negotiating interim agreements leading to a nuclear weapons convention as early as possible. The genuineness and constructiveness of this commitment will be gauged from the positions taken by Britain in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, the Conference on Disarmament, five-power talks, NATO, and other related fora.

We are not publicly launching this project until 2 May, 1998, and will not begin our attempts at disarmament until 11 August, 1998, as we wish there to be time for dialogue with you about these criteria and your security concerns and defence policies, as well as our planned actions, which we believe to be ethical, humane, open, nonviolent and lawful.We have enclosed a copy of our Handbook containing a fairly comprehensive overview of our project, which we hope you will find useful. You will see from this that on 2 May we will be giving a list of all the names and addresses of people who have signed the Pledge to Prevent Nuclear Crime and who are willing to take part in the disarmament work. These lists will be updated from time to time as new people join in the project.

We have assembled a team consisting of Trident Ploughshares Core Group members and independent experts and mediators, from which a small group of four to six people will be drawn for meetings with you and your representatives. We hope that you will find a convenient time as soon as possible for urgent discussions regarding the necessity to take immediate steps towards disarming British nuclear weapons and moving towards a non-nuclear defence policy.

Yours sincerely,

Sylvia Boyes, Tracy Hart, Ellen Moxley, Brian Quail, Helen Steven, Ian Thomson, and Angie Zelter.

Enclosures:- Trident Ploughshares 2000 Handbook.

CC:- HM Queen Elizabeth; Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Secretary for Defence; Attorney General; Lord Advocate; Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jock Slater, all Captains of the Trident Submarines and Rear Admirals of FOSNNI and FOSM.

References

[Ref. 1] - Letter from Hazel Finch, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence to Angie Zelter, 23/10/97 Ref.D/PACS/8/1/5. [Ref. 2].- Written Answer from Tony Lloyd in answer to Parliamentary Question by Dr. Howard Stoate. Hansard Column 271 of 28/1/98. [Ref. 3] - Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion [Ref. 4] - Decision 2, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted on 12th May 1995, 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part 1 (NPT/CONF.1995/32). [Ref. 5] - Letter from M.R.Etherton, Security Policy Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Angie Zelter, 9/7/97. [Ref. 6] - Letter from Stephen Willmer, Assistant Director of the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence to Angie Zelter, 20/1/98 Ref.D/PACS/8/1/5.

Appendix 1. Key Elements of the International Court of Justice’s Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear weapons have ’unique characteristics’, including ’their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come;’ their ’destructive power ... cannot be contained in either space or time’ a nuclear explosion ’releases not only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also powerful and prolonged radiation,’ which ’would affect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area,’ and ’has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generation’ [Ref.1].

Under humanitarian law, ’methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, ...the use of such weapons is scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements.’ [Ref.2].

Self-defence warrants ’only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it,’ and ’a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’ [Ref.3].

The environment ’represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn,’ and ’States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives’ and in implementation of the law applicable in armed conflict [Ref.4].

The nuclear weapon states failed to demonstrate that any use of nuclear weapons, including a ’clean’ use involving ’low-yield’ weapons could comply with legal requirements or avoid catastrophic escalation [Ref.5].

’If the use of force itself in a given case is illegal - for whatever reason - the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.’ [Ref.6].

The force of the holding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal is overwhelming when viewed in the context of the entire opinion. It was qualified by the statement that ’the Court cannot conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.’ [Ref.7]. In explanation, the Court referred to the right of self-defence, the policy of deterrence, whose legality the Court declined directly to assess, and the elements of fact and law at its disposal. However, threat or use in such a circumstance remains subject to the requirements of humanitarian law. As the Court stated, a ’fundamental’ and ’intransgressible’ rule is that ’States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.’ [Ref.8].

Perhaps one of the most important results of the Advisory Opinion was the endorsement by every judge on the Court of the interpretation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that ’there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’ [Ref.9]. The Court explained that Article IV imposes ’an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith’. [Ref.10]. The Court observed that nuclear disarmament is ’an objective of vital importance to the whole of the international community today.’ [Ref.11]. Of special significance is the holding that that Article VI requires states to achieve nuclear disarmament - talking is not enough, the talk must lead to action. Also important is that the Court delinked the obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament from the obligation, also found in Article VI, to establish a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

While noting the opinion’s advisory character, the nuclear weapon states have not sought to deny its authority, recognising that the ICJ has authoritatively interpreted law which states acknowledge they must follow. Rather, the nuclear weapons states have claimed that their policies comply with the law as stated in the opinion, referring to the Court’s refusal directly to pass upon deterrence, its uncertainty with respect to an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a state is at stake, and arms and control and non-proliferation measures such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, most of the world disagrees. [Ref.12]. 116 states voted for the December 1997 General Assembly resolution initiated by Malaysia calling for the commencement of negotiations in 1998 leading to an early conclusion of an international treaty to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons - a necessary step for the implementation of the ICJ Opinion. [Ref. 13].

References

[1] Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[2] Paragraph 95 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[3] Paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[4] Paragraphs 29, 30 and 33 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[5] Paragraph 94 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[6] Paragraph 47 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[7] Paragraph 105(2)E of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[8] Paragraphs 78 and 79 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[9] Paragraph 2F of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[10] Paragraph 99 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[11] Paragraphs 100 and 103 of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No.95 (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).

[12] The (Il)legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons - A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice’, John Burroughs, IALANA, 1997.

[13] World Court Project UK Newsletter, Spring 1998.

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