5. Practical Trident Disarmament
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Tri-denting It Handbook, 3rd Ed (2001)
Part 5
Practical Trident Disarmament
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Contents
5.1 Background Information on Trident, Faslane and Coulport
5.2 How To Safely Disarm a Trident Submarine
5.2.1 Some General Safety Considerations
5.2.2 Ideas for Disarmament
5.3 Background information on Aldermaston and Burghfield
5.3.1 What are AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield?
5.3.2 Where are they?
5.3.3 Some Ideas for Action
5.4 Other Trident-Related Sites
References and Acknowledgements
5.1 Background Information on Trident, Faslane and Coulport
In the mid to late 1970s the British Government
set up a secret committee to determine a replacement
for the Polaris fleet. That led to the decision to
build four submarines designed to carry the US
Trident missiles, armed with British-built nuclear
warheads. The UK Trident submarine-launched nuclear
missile programme has been aided and abetted
throughout its design, development and deployment by the
US Government.
Although the US has not directly provided the UK
with a complete nuclear warhead for Trident, it has
done everything but, through discussion groups, the
supply of design, development and manufacturing information and the provision of materials
and technology. All British nuclear weapons are
almost entirely dependent on US technology and
support. Some 30 per cent of the total Government
estimated cost of Trident is being spent in the United States.
The British Trident missiles are leased from a
central US missile pool. The missiles will also be refurbished
in US facilities.
The US has also supplied:
 Highly enriched uranium to fuel the
nuclear reactors onboard Trident submarines;
Assistance with the design and testing of
the Trident warhead;
All sixteen missile tubes for the first
Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard and technical assistance to aid in the installation of
the missile tubes in the other three Trident submarines; and
Targeting, communication and
guidance systems for Britain’s Trident missiles and
the use of US navigation satellites.
The submarine’s pressurised water reactor power plant is designed to operate seven years
without overhaul. The original prototype of this reactor
is kept at HMS Vulcan, next door to Dounreay.
Trident is a major escalation in Britain’s nuclear
war fighting capability. The previous
Polaris/Chevaline system was only able to hit one target per
missile regardless of how many warheads were being
carried. Trident on the other hand has
independently targetable warheads. Every warhead that is carried
on Trident can hit its own target. Trident also has a
far greater range, is far more accurate and can hit
its targets in a far shorter time period.
The four British Trident submarines are HMS
Vanguard (first patrol 13/12/94), HMS Victorious (first patrol 7/1/96), HMS Vigilant (first patrol 1997), and HMS Vengeance (first patrol estimated
early 2001).
British Trident submarines are based at the
Clyde Submarine Base, Faslane, in Scotland, where
the routine maintenance between patrols is carried
out. RNAD Coulport handles the nuclear warheads. Normally there are 144 nuclear warheads
on submarines plus between 30 and 50 at RNAD
Coulport. Coulport inspects warheads and carries out
basic maintenance work on them. From time to time
small numbers of warheads are removed from each submarine and replaced. This is done at
Coulport. Trident missiles can also be removed and there
are bunkers to store up to 16 missiles on land,
but normally the missiles remain on the submarine at
all times. The missiles are loaded and unloaded at
the US Navy Base at Kings Bay, Georgia. Coulport is
also the storage and loading/unloading port for
the conventional torpedoes.
The British Trident missiles are serviced at Kings
Bay. The British missiles are ordered and stored with
the US missiles and not assigned to Britain until they
are drawn out of inventory to install in a British
submarine. The missiles normally stay in the submarine
for the duration of its seven-year commission, but capabilities are available at RNAD Coulport for
the removal of missiles in an emergency. The Navy submarine museum at Gosport is worth a visit.
It does not have a Trident but the old subs are
there and will give you a feel of what a sub is like. They
are basically all the same with minor modifications
for electronics and different weapons systems etc.
The address is The Royal Sub Museum, Haslar Jetty
Rd, Gosport, Hampshire, PO12 2AS. Tel: 01705-529217.
 Coulport and Faslane
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 Faslane
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 Coulport
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Comparison of Polaris with Trident
| | No. of subs | Yield per Warhead (kt) | Warhead deployment per sub | Max. warhead deployment on 3 operational subs | Max. no. of targets per sub | Range (kms) | Accuracy (metres) | | Polaris | 4 | 200 | 32 | 96 | 16 | 4,700 | 900 | | Trident | 4 | 100 | 48 | 144 | 48 | 7,400 | 120 |
Specifications for the British Trident Submarines
| Length | 491 feet | | Hull diameter | 43.3 feet | | Height | 4 stories | | Displacement | 16,000 tonnes submerged. | | Speed | 25 knots submerged | | Power plant | 1 pressurized water PWR-2 nuclear reactor, geared steam turbines, 1 shaft | | Crew | 132 | | Armaments | 4 torpedo tubes for Spearfish torpedos, 16 Trident-II D5 SLBMs carrying a maximum of 48 Mk-4/100-kt MIRVs |
Specifications for the Trident-II D5 Missiles:
| Length | 44.6 feet | | Diameter | 83 inches | | Launch weight | 130,000 lbs | | Weight | 130,000+ lbs | | Number of motors (stages) | 3 plus post-boost control system | | Range | 4,000+ nautical miles | | Navigation system | Two-dimensional stellar inertial guidance (SIG) NAVSTAR GPS update to position the sub before launch | | Accuracy | 400-500 feet CEP | | Max. warhead loading | 8 Mark-5/W-88,475 kt. MIRVs, or 12 Mark-4/W-76, 100 kt MIRVs |
5.2 How To Safely Disarm a Trident Submarine
General common sense is your best guide plus
thorough thought, discussion and role play. Remember
that it is more important to be peaceful, loving
and accountable than to get to the submarine, road
or pylon to disarm it at a particular time. The
intention and commitment is what matters - the intention
to peacefully disarm and the commitment to keep
coming back and trying again. This total commitment
means that there will be no excuse for the authorities to
treat us badly - they can just arrest us quietly - but then
they will have to put us in prison to stop us trying again
and yet again. The more peaceful and accountable we
are the more we will attract others to join us and
with hundreds and thousands of people joining us we
have more chance of total and complete disarmament.
The easiest way the authorities have of
stopping Trident Ploughshares growing is to portray us
as violent and terroristic, therefore we must be
careful to act in ways that can never honestly be
interpreted as such. Of course, we may have to contend
with dishonest slurs on our behaviour but these slurs
will not hold up if we really are loving and open in all
our actions.
5.2.1 Some General Safety Considerations
Emergency vehicles - to ensure that ambulances
and fire engines can still operate in the base please
ensure that any blockades and road digging can be
easily cleared or bridged for emergency access.
Razor Wire - is very sharp so you can get a
serious cut and not notice it. It can sometimes spring
back at you when you cut it, so be careful to allow it
room to do so without harming yourselves. It is best
to remove whole bits back to their ties and all bits
that stick out rather than risk getting snagged. There
is usually a coil of razor wire on top of the 3
metre weld mesh and usually three coils piled up on
the ground inside the fence, sometimes more. It is possible to climb over the coils without cutting it
if you use a piece of strong carpet laid over the
coils. Choose a place where the coils are most dense
and strongest. Take First Aid with you in case you
get cut and a torch for night cutting. There is
fencing within fencing, and once you have managed to
get through one area there are often several other
areas that will need similar treatment.
Dogs - are always near their handlers and are
well trained. Keep still and wait until the handler calls
the dog off. Usually you are warned by the handler
before the dog is let loose and the dog usually goes for
any person running away. They are often used to
find people hiding or to search rough ground. Keep
calm and if in doubt just keep still and quiet.
Guns - as far as we know the only Ministry of
Defence Police with guns are those at the gates.
However, armed Marines guard all the high security areas,
like the warhead bunkers and the submarine berths.
If challenged by them identify yourself as an
unarmed protester. A Faslane Peace Camper who swam onto
a submarine tapped a marine on the shoulder and
said ’Hi, I’m from the Peace Camp’ and he fainted
with shock! Remember he may be as freaked out to see
you as you are him. It is best to assume that there is
a shoot to kill policy in operation in all highly
secure areas. We will not know their exact orders but
if discovered make sure you stay still and quiet
and hold your hands out to show they are empty and
you pose no threat. Speak quietly and calmly and say
you will do no harm. Unarmed protesters have been discovered over the years by armed guards in
very difficult circumstances without being shot. This
is because it would be highly politically embarrassing
for an unarmed peace protester to be shot whilst
protesting about the illegality and immorality of weapons
of mass destruction. Bear in mind that the guards
may be very nervous and unsure of when or if to pull
the trigger so make it clear that you pose no threat.
Be sensitive. Not only do we not want any activist
shot but we also do not want any guard to have that
on their conscience either.
Cliffs - Coulport is a very big base, much of it on
rough hillside which is unlit. There are steep cliffs and
ravines. Don’t run if you cannot see where you are going.
Water - the water in the Clyde is always cold so
wear suitable clothing. It is tidal and there are
currents. And remember that the weather conditions
can change quite rapidly. It is advisable to talk to
someone with local knowledge (contact the Peace Camp
or Scottish CND office for contacts) and study the
tide tables and maps before going onto the water.
Police and Marines drive about in fast powerful boats
of various kinds. If the only way to stop you in your
boat or canoe is to capsize you they won’t think twice,
they will however then rescue you from the water.
Swimmers will be blocked and hauled out of the water.
The police can get tens of boats into the water quite
fast. There are eight special guard boats plus armed
guards with Trident and there are thirteen launchers
and many inflatables for both Faslane and Coulport.
With the warning we are giving them they may easily
be able to call on reinforcements if necessary. At
night, police and marines drive about fast with no lights
on. Tugs and other boats may also be moving about. Armed Marines patrol the decks of the
submarines and the dockside.
Typical security for escorting Trident subs
might include two large tug boats, two or three
police launches (one of which leads the procession with a
blue flashing light), six special forces rigid inflatables
(with armed soldiers) which seem to be almost glued to
the sub, three on each side. Then there are any number
of aquaplods whose role it is to keep us away. A
recent defence security exercise at Coulport involving a
sea action by Royal Marines succeeded in
overwhelming the security. They had about eight fast boats
and managed to land folk on both the old Polaris jetty
and the newer Trident Explosives Handling jetty.
Greenpeace have also managed to get people onto HMS
Revenge using four boats. Anyone wanting maps of the
area showing the restricted zones around the base waterfronts should contact the Core Group or
Faslane Peace Camp.
There is a pump-jet (an internal propeller)
which sucks in water along the sides of the sub, so avoid
this area of large water intake. Also be careful of the
area of water around all moving vessels that can
draw small craft in. An MoD Policeman was killed in
an exercise when he was manouvering his boat at
high speed at night in front of a Trident
submarine.
When Clyde Sea Action began in 1986 with the widening of the entrance to the Gareloch the
reaction to the waterborne actions was a bit heavy. There
was ramming and capsizing of boats. However, relationships have improved and there tends to be
less of this now. A rough law might be ’The level of
MoD response is proportional to the level of
embarrassment caused’. If you outmanoeuvre an aquaplod who
has spent a lot of time training then they may respond in
a fairly irresponsible way.
You are less obviously a protester if you wear a
wetsuit. Sometimes there are exercises on the base
when thunder flashes (powerful fireworks) are thrown
into the water. They can make a swimmer
unconscious. However, several protesters have managed to swim
in and enter submarines without harm. Wearing protective wet-suits will protect you from the cold
and any possibility of unlikely stings of ordinary
jellyfish. During all three of the Disarmament camps held
in August 1998, 1999 and 2000, pledgers have got within a few yards of the Trident berth at Faslane
by swimming across the loch and through the
floating boom at night.
There are many ways of getting into the base -
not only through the wires, but also over, under,
around, by sea, land, or air, by balloon, parachute,
hang-glider, canoe, raft, diving, bicycle, stilts, misleading
costumes, old cars, with all kinds of tools.
Nuclear reactor and nuclear warheads - A
Trident submarine is a floating nuclear power plant.
Damaging unidentified equipment could affect the safe
operation of the nuclear reactor. Some equipment in the
main control room is related to reactor operations. Do
not interfere in any way with the nuclear reactor areas,
the warheads, the missiles or the missile fire
control computers or bunkers where the warheads are
stored. On the submarine these areas are situated to the back
of the conning tower, the long end of the sub, but the
front area contains the torpedoes which are also a
problem, and there are reactor-safety-critical components
are throughout the submarine. Any fire on a
Trident submarine is a major incident with potentially
disastrous consequences. Great care should be taken to
avoid taking any action, such as damaging
electrical equipment, which could result in a fire. Any cables
or pipes that go into the submarine from the
dockside should be left alone as we do not want to risk
cutting through the back-up emergency systems for the
nuclear reactor. See the photo for a glimpse of just how
many wires and cables there can be. Trident missiles
each contain over 50 tonnes of high explosive and rocket
fuel, in addition to the nuclear warheads. The third stage
of the rocket around which the warheads are placed
is made of a type of rocket fuel which is particularly
prone to accidental detonation.
The Spearfish torpedoes are powered by Otto
fuel which is both a toxic and an explosive hazard.
There has been at least one fatal accident during early
trials on these torpedoes. An accidental explosion is
more likely to occur on Spearfish torpedoes than on
the older ones which used to be in service.
The submarine casing on the outside should be
safe to hammer upon as it has to withstand very
high pressures when it dives in deep seas but do
not hammer or strike the missile tubes or the area
under which the nuclear reactor can be found. The
pouring of sticky substances or paint over the entire
outer surface of the submarine would be safe however.
It is best to be absolutely safe and sure of what
you are doing and if in doubt do not do it. If you do
not know for certain what a piece of equipment is
for, then leave it alone. The front of the submarine,
in front of the conning tower, (the short end), is
away from both nuclear reactor and nuclear missiles
and therefore is the safest place to hammer, drill or
cut. Also remember that any ’secret’ or
’unannounced’ Ploughshares actions must still be accountable.
We are not doing a sabotage action but a
considered disarmament action and are willing to take
the consequences of our actions and explain why we
are doing them. There may be a greater risk of
violence from security personnel in ’secret’ actions as they
will not be expecting us. So make sure you have
thought up ways of making your sudden presence unthreatening and obviously peaceful.
5.2.2 Ideas for Disarmament
 It is up to each affinity group to decide what
and how it will disarm - within the nonviolent and
safety ground-rules of the whole project. Only do what
your whole group feels comfortable and safe doing
and what you are capable of doing.
Inside the Trident submarine - some general
ideas are to superglue the lock to the safe where the
firing codes are held or blockade yourself inside the
control room, sleeping quarters, toilets, kitchen area or
lock-on anywhere inside the submarine except the
areas indicated in the diagram of HMS Victorious
(areas 11,16, 20 and 27) where no-one should go. The
subs cannot go to sea with an activist on board. Drill
holes from the inside to the outside to create leakages.
Find the periscope and communications controls and
make them unworkable. Damage the door fixings to
prevent the doors from sealing properly.
Please refer to the diagram of the Trident
submarine, HMS Victorious, with numbered areas.
 The following areas should be left alone:-
Area 11 - the nuclear reactor
Area 16 - the Trident missile tubes
Area 20 - the diesel generator as
this is vital for reactor safety
Area 27 - the torpedo stores
Caution should be exercised in Area 18 - the
missile control centre - equipment to control the safety
of the environment in which the missiles sit
onboard the sub are within this room. Damage to any
equipment in this room could affect the missiles.
However, the liberal spreading of syrup, paint, jam and
glue should be safe and effective. Also be careful in
Area 33 as there may be some torpedoes here and
be cautious in Area 10 as the engine room
controls may also contain reactor controls.
Key areas that are safe to disarm using all
available nonviolent means are:
Areas 3 and 4 - the rudder machines and
the clutch. Like any vehicle if you damage the steering and the gears it will not go very far.
Area 13 - the evaporator/distiller. This
provides fresh water for the sub and recycles the air
the crew breathe. Putting this out of action means the sub cannot go anywhere.
Area 17 - navigation centre. This area is
self-explanatory and the same applies to this area
as to areas 21 and 29.
Area 21 - the main control room. This is
the brains of the submarine, running the entire operating system. Any substance poured
into computers in here will create havoc with the
electronics but be careful of the reactor controls and leave them
alone.
Area 28 - hydroplane machinery. This
area controls whether the sub goes up or down. Any disarming done in here will render
Trident inoperable.
Area 29 - the operations room. Like the
main control room this is another key area of the
sub. From here threats to the sub are assessed and responded to. Again there are plenty
of electronics to damage that would render the sub inoperable but leave alone the reactor controls.
On the outside of the Trident submarine -
hammer on the openings and flaps. Hammer the sonar
arrays around the front. Damage any sonar arrays that
are for dragging behind the sub (called the towed
array) and that may be somewhere near the docked sub
and slightly submerged. They are also often on the top
of the submarine. If you look at the photo overleaf,
you can see at the back an object that looks just like
a huge cotton reel. This is part of the towed array
and the cables on the reel can be cut through to
great effect!
The submarine surface is covered with anechoic
tiles that deafen and absorb any sound, therefore
making the submarine harder to detect. Any anomaly in
these tiles will create a noise. By removing the tiles,
throwing paint or any other substance over them, you
will make it more visible and audible to the ’enemy’
and therefore unusable. In practice they often come
into port with tiles missing so you would have to
remove quite a few to make much difference.
On top of the conning tower there are numerous holes and cavities where radio and radar
antennae and periscopes are usually kept. Most of these
are usually retracted. These can be damaged through
the use of metal punches, screwdrivers or any long
piece of metal being driven into them and then
superglued in place. The communication equipment on
the conning tower (periscope, antennae etc) could also
be cut, hammered, or bent in various ways. All of
this will damage these very sensitive items of
equipment rendering the sub blind and therefore unable to
go to sea before repairs are carried out.
Sticky jam, syrup, treacle, glue, and other
adhesive materials are also useful and can be used to bung
up the periscopes and radar antennae if poured
into these cavities. Syrup or treacle with sand, salt
and water added have been found to be more
effective than jam. Concrete and arc welders could be used
on the diving planes at the front of the submarine.
The Hunter-Killer submarines that accompany
the Tridents are part of the system and can be
disarmed in a similar way to Trident. At present (January
2001), six of the fleet of twelve Trafalgar and Swiftsure
class subs have been found at risk of the same cooling
and system cracking as HMS Tireless that is still
docked at the emergency (Z) berth in Gibraltar
undergoing repair after a near reactor meltdown.
You might feel that the tugs and police launches
that guard the Trident subs and guide it into
port, are also part of the system and need
disarming.
In March 1998 four TP women whilst on a
pre-August reconnoitre found a police boat with its keys in it at
the dock at Coulport. They borrowed it for a War
Crimes Inspection and after inspecting the
Explosives Handling Jetty at Coulport took it 14 miles round
the loch to Faslane where they landed one of the
women on the floating boom before being arrested. When
the opportunity presents itself military equipment can
be quite useful in disarmament work! Such
opportunistic work however, inevitably carries an increased
element of risk, because it isn’t planned. Practise the skills
of quick decision making in your affinity groups.
The ship-lift at Faslane - the ship-lift
building contains facilities for the 491 foot Trident
submarines to be lifted clear of the water to carry out
the maintenance work that is essential to keep
Trident operational and would have to stop if peace
activists were also there. There are three levels from
which workers can reach the 80 foot high sub. By using
a saw or some other useful tool you could damage
the various cranes, gantries and other equipment.
Damaging cranes at Faslane in the Trident area would
stop repairs or loading of stores to Trident subs.
Damage can also be done by unscrewing screws or bolts
and by drilling holes in vulnerable places.
Access routes - the Rhu Narrows are a bottleneck
for Trident submarines coming in and out of Faslane
and blockading them or other parts of the channel is
a possibility. Buoys and weights joined by steel
cables can be floated in the water. Fishing nets can be laid
and also boats can be turned over to get in the way.
How about sending messages to all boat and ship
owners to come and block the narrows? There is a 12
knot speed limit. How about a Reclaim the Seas
action? There are lights and radar towers on the Rhu
Narrows that could be occupied although there are
probably alternative guidance systems for Trident to use.
All actions should take into account the fact that
a submarine running aground could result in a
nuclear accident. The sub has to have clearance
underneath for nuclear safety - there are water intakes for
the reactor cooling system on the bottom of the
sub. Also a collision with the ground could affect
reactor operations, so put up warnings along with
the blockades and contact the base too.
Locking on to the boom would also restrict
access. See the photo opposite for details of
linkage between the boom parts where you can lock
on. There is an infra-red system that is meant to pick
up canoes and boats approaching from the sea but
all security systems are fallible. Part of the boom
round the Trident area is like a gate and is opened to
let subs in and out. You can stand on it and it is possible to lock on to various parts of it as well
as to get through or over it quite easily. Check it
out for size. We have had almost 20 incursions into
the high security boom area over the three years of
the project. It would be a good idea if your
affinity group visits Faslane at least once before
your planned action to get your bearings and check
the feasibility of your plans.
Digging up various access roads with pick-axes
or JCBs and setting up barricades with old cars
and locking on to them, in and outside the bases could
be good. The access road from the nuclear warhead storage bunkers is vital. When thinking about
digging up roads remember access for emergency
vehicles. There are two roads to the Explosives Handling
Jetty at Coulport, one is too steep for warhead
transport, but could be used for emergency vehicles. A
nuclear accident could happen at any time with so
many nuclear reactors in the various subs there or with
the nuclear warheads and there needs to be access
for all the emergency vehicles. If you plan any
blockade or road digging then make sure you have safe
and workable plans and equipment to bridge any hole
in the road or to lift the blockade for access to emergency vehicles. We are trying to stop the
movement of heavy warhead transport and of supplies
to and from the sites NOT access by emergency
ambulances and fire engines. There are many minor accidents and emergency vehicles go in and out on
a very regular basis.
5.3 Background information on Aldermaston and Burghfield
5.3.1 What are AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield?
 Aldermaston Map
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The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston has been at the centre of
British nuclear weapons production during most of
Britain’s nuclear programme. And from the marches of
the 1950s and 1960s to the present day,the site
has attracted a fluctuating amount of interest
from anti-nuclear campaigners,environmentalists
andanti-militarists.
AWEplc (the company), at the Aldermaston site, specifically, is currently responsible for
the production, maintenance and (eventual) decommissioning of Britain’s Trident warheads. It
is also engaged in developing other areas of
nuclear science: including laser technology and
materials testing. AWE also retains the capacity
for developing a new generation of nuclear
weapons, should the British government decide to
upgrade/replace Trident at some point in the
future (something which, it has been suggested, is
already in the pipeline).
Aldermaston is owned by the British government, specifically the Ministry of Defence, but since
the early 1990s AWE has had ’GOCO’ status, that is Government Owned - Contractor Operated.
This means that while the Ministry own the site,
private companies manage day to day operations,
and somehow (we’ve never quite figured this one
out), make a profit. This status also applies to
AWE Burghfield - Aldermaston’ssister site,
located approximately seven miles away.At Burghfield,
high explosives (necessary to detonation) are
packed into the warheads (and also removed - for maintenance and in decommissioning). Burghfield
is also an occasional home to the nuclear warhead convoy - ’greens’ (when it pops by to
collect/deliver warheads for deployment/servicing). Though
the ’greens’ do not visit Aldermaston directly, the
site has special status as home to Special Nuclear Materials convoy vehicles (’Blues’). These
small trucks trundle around Britain with the MoD’s ’Special Escort Group’,
collecting/depositing nuclear materials. Their favourite
destinations include: Sellafield (BNFL, Cumbria),
Chapelcross (MoD reactor, Scottish borders), Harwell
(AEATech, Oxfordshire) and Rolls Royce Nuclear
(submarine nuclear reactor manufacturers, Derby).
For seven years, until April 2000, the AWEs
were managed by the Hunting-BRAE consortium
(Hunting Plc, Brown and Root and AEATech). However
since Hunting-BRAE’s contract expired on 31 March
2000 the government chose a new consortium to
manage the site from 1 April 2000. This consortium
is comprised of BNFL, Lockheed Martin and Serco.
Most British activists probably know a thing or two
about BNFL, whereas Lockheed and Serco may be less
well known. In fact Lockheed is one of the biggest weapons manufacturers in the world (responsible
for the Trident missile bodies, the stealth bomber
and manages several US nuclear installations such as
Oak Ridge in Tennessee). Serco is a ’facilities management’ company who have been
the beneficiaries of many British contracts,
particularly in the field of private prisons, rail and
hospitals. They all have websites where you can find out
more information about their dodgy corporate goings-on.
In terms of waste, AWE Aldermaston is engaged
in burning, burying, flushing and storing all grades
of radioactive waste. BNFL’s Drigg site and Southampton’s Shanks incinerator have
contracts with AWE, for burying and burning
respectively, other waste is deposited into small brooks
which flow from the site itself, or through the
(now infamous) Pangbourne pipeline, where it is
deposited into the Thames. Yum. Aldermaston has
many unpleasant features, including ’hot-spots’
(from historic dumpings/accidents), chemical contamination of parts of the site and its
environs, and a large store of radioactive waste on-site.
Both sites do have dangerous areas both intended
and otherwise, so if you are taking action try to find
out as much information as possible beforehand
about all the possible health and safety consequences
of your action.
We hope from the above text, you can see how critical it is that anti-nuclear, environmental
and anti-militarist activists apply and maintain
pressure on Aldermaston (and Burghfield) as part of
our continuing resistance to Trident.
5.3.2 Where are they?
5.3.3 Some Ideas for Action
General
AWE Aldermaston is a hard nut to crack unless
you have the right tools for the job. Choose your methods carefully and hope for a healthy dose
of luck. However, nowhere can be perfectly
defended and there are several weak points around the
site. Ultimately if police resources are stretched by
several incursions or there is a strong element of
surprise (like taking action NOT at a TP disarmament
camp), one or more groups have a good chance of
getting somewhere. Unlike Faslane and Coulport, the site
has the luxury of being at least 40 miles from the
sea, and is surrounded by useful bushes and trees,
with several dark areas. The perimeter is about six
miles, so without a vast increase in policing, it is
impossible for the entire site to be observed at all
times, although there are many cameras.
Safety
Like Faslane and Coulport, both AWEs at Aldermaston and Burghfield are defended
by Ministry of Defence Police (MDP). They are
armed with pistols and machine guns. They also have
the usual range of dogs, cuffs and possibly other
non-lethal weapons (though women from the regular peace camp have never seen them with any).
There is no history of serious injury being inflicted
on protesters at the AWEs, although several women
have regularly received minor injuries and had
dogs released on them (and in some cases been bitten!).
At Aldermaston the A90 area (the ’dark side’)
is ’protected’ by up to three extra fences (depending
on where you approach from) and has armoured vehicles patrolling (Tacticas).
At Burghfield commando-style MDP ’Response
Force’ personnel defend the high security area
from foxholes. So be prepared!
Radiation: At Aldermaston there are
several contaminated areas on the site and around
the perimeter, resulting from both radioactive and chemical spills/dumps etc. These are located at
the Northwest and Southeast corners of the site (external) and internally around the old reactor
site (see map on page 84). The entire ’A’ area should
be assumed to be mildly radioactive and also the storage areas (large amounts of radioactive waste
are stored on site). The North Ponds area is the site
of historic radioactive contamination and is also
the store for Tritiated water being released into
the Aldermaston brook (which is also contaminated
some times more than others), so try not to fall in!
Security
The entire Aldermaston site is surrounded by
a minimum of two fences. The first perimeter is a regular chainlink fence topped with barbed wire.
The second is a 15 foot (2.5m) high weldmesh
fence, topped with rolls of razor wire. There are approximately five thin sensor wires held taut
about two foot out from the fence and running from about one foot from the ground to near the top.
A mixture of static and highly manoeuvrable
infrared cameras also surrounds the site. The ’A’ area
is surrounded by a further chainlink fence. You
may encounter several more depending on which way you travel across the site.
At Burghfield the perimeter is chain-link with
five sensor wires held off the inner wall of the fence
by struts. However, it is possible to cut through
the fence and very carefully slip through between
two sensors (if you are lucky, skinny, take your time etc).
Possible targets for disarmament work
ALDERMASTON
Convoy vehicles (both blue and green). For technical information about these vehicles
you could try Nukewatch or Scottish CND (see Part
10.1 for contact information).
The admin building/home to the Chief
Executive. There are lots of lovely bits of
paper and computers in these officers which it would
no doubt be tragic to lose. There would also be opportunities for using their power
supply/phone lines etc for broadcasting out during
an occupation.
The A90/’A’ complex. This building is vital to
the production of Trident, because of this it is
also potentially very dangerous to interfere with
its operations. If you seriously intend taking action
here or at other sensitive sites in the ’A’ complex
please seek lots of advice first. Even interfering
with ventilation systems could have catastrophic
results. Never do anything unless you know the consequences of your actions are safe.
The Special Escort Group. These personnel and
their vehicles are required in order for the convoy to
move anywhere. Their HQ and garages are located to
the left and ahead of Tadley Gate (see map on page 84).
BURGHFIELD
Convoy vehicles/high security area (HSA).
In order to get near here you either have to
approach from the south side, minding ditches, walls,
the many cameras and the Rapid Response Force.
This is possible (others have done it), but requires
both skill and luck. Alternatively you could
approach from the east and take your time (less obvious,
but more chance of getting caught en route). The convoy support vehicles hang around
outside the HSA and are much easier to reach (see map
on page 85). The convoy cannot travel without
these vehicles.
Blockading. Burghfield only has two gates and
can (and has been) effectively blockaded by just
two women before now. A larger and
better-resourced group could hold the base for a long time. If
the warhead convoy is on-site and about to take Trident up to Scotland then this would be the
most politically effective time to launch such an action.
Aldermaston local facilities
Toilets Mulfords Hill (Tadley) 24hrs M and F
Post Offices Mulfords Hill, Pamper Heath Rd (9-5)
Photocopying facilities Mulfords Hill PO (5p), Tadley Library (10p)
and Pamber Heath Rd PO/shop (open Sundays too!)
Faxing facilities Mulfords Hill - Redwood Estate Agents
Public phones Aldermaston Rd (01265 314700), Burnham Rd
Hospital/A and E Royal Berks, London Rd, Reading (01189 877020)
Chemists Next to Budgens Supermarket (9-7)
DIY equipment 56 Bishopswood Rd, Tadley and Mulfords Hill
Cashpoints Link and RBS (Old Forge - Heath End Rd
and TSB Mulfords Hill) Barclays - Mulfords Hill
Travel Information
Reading Buses (143) 01189 594000
Hampshire Bus 01256 464501
The Bee Line (Bus) 01344 424938
Nearest Bus stops:
From Reading train station - Franklin Rd
Bus no. 143
From Basingstoke train station - Falcon Inn
Bus no 50/51 (A)
Nearest train stations (in order of closeness - first = nearest)
Mortimer (10 mins) but better connected
Aldermaston (10 mins)
Reading (25 mins) On bus route to Tadley (143)
Basingstoke (25-30 mins) On bus route to Tadley (50/51)
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5.4 Other Trident-Related Sites
Some affinity groups will want to disarm
essential parts of the Trident system that are not located
at Faslane, Coulport, Aldermaston or Burghfield.
Trident submarines were built at Barrow by
Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd (VSEL), now
BAe systems. Nuclear materials for Sellafield are
also received at Barrow.
Trident submarines are based at
Faslane and their warheads are stored at
Coulport. The missiles - which the subs themselves bring across from the US -
stay on board. They are taken back to the US for
maintenance. Coulport is the only place in Britain that
we know of where rocket fuel, high explosives and plutonium are kept in close proximity.
Most components for Trident warheads are built
at the Atomic Weapons Establishment,
Aldermaston. This site has cradle to grave responsibility for
all British nuclear weapons. It is however highly radioactive in certain areas and large quantities
of explosives are stored in other areas. Caution
is advised if entering this site.
All components for British nuclear weapons are transported to Atomic Weapons
Establishment, Burghfield. Here they are assembled into
nuclear weapons. They are transported by road to
Coulport with overnight stopping places at
Wittering, Albermarle and Longtown. There are regular
convoys taking small numbers of warheads to Burghfield
for detailed inspection - they are then either
refurbished, or replaced with newly-built warheads.
The nuclear reactors that power the Trident
submarines are built by Rolls Royce at
Derby before being moved by rail to Barrow for installation. The fuel
that powers Trident’s nuclear reactors is also made
here. Little is known of this site yet it plays a key role in
the Trident programme. The fuel rods are
manufactured at Springfields. The prototype of the reactor
used on Trident submarines is at HMS Vulcan which is
run by Rolls Royce Associates at Dounreay. The
reactor was refuelled in 1998 with a fuel core designed
to run for 15 years.
The major nuclear elements in the warheads are plutonium, tritium and Highly Enriched Uranium
(HEU). Plutonium has always been produced and stored
at Sellafield, through the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear reactors at
Calderhall and Chapelcross. No plutonium for use in
nuclear weapons is currently being produced here but
large stocks of military plutonium are held in
special vaults at the site.
Uranium enrichment took place at
Capenhurst up until a few years ago. Owing to the large stocks
of HEU now held by Britain the special military
enrichment plant at Capenhurst is no longer in use.
Tritium production goes on at Chapelcross. The same reactors that used to produce plutonium
for the bomb now help to produce tritium. Tritium
is one of the key ingredients in modern day
nuclear weapons. Without a continuing fresh supply
of tritium Trident warheads would wither and die.
When on patrol, each Trident submarine is
escorted by a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine.
These are also built at Barrow and are based at Faslane
or Devonport.
Anti-submarine helicopters used to support
Trident will be based at RAF Culdrose in Cornwall, and
will continue to operate from Prestwick. The
Nimrod aircraft support base for Trident is at
Kinloss.
The Trident submarines will all be refitted at Devonport. New facilities for these refits are
being constructed over the next few years. Any delays
or cost overruns to this construction programme
will have a serious knock-on effect for the
operational viability of Trident.
Some of the hunter-killers are at present refitted
at Rosyth but all this work will soon be transferred
to Devonport.
Rosyth and Devonport dockyards are also the dumping grounds for old, withdrawn nuclear
submarines. Both sites have extracted the nuclear fuel
(the reactor core) from several submarines as part
of refitting or decommissioning. These cores are transported to Sellafield where they are stored
until someone finds a way of reprocessing and/or
disposing of them. Rosyth and Devonport also have
large quantities of low and medium level nuclear
waste stored on-site.
Command and control systems begin with the Ministry of Defence in
Whitehall, London. Actual operational instructions are transmitted from
RAF Northwood. However, Trident is also linked into
the US command and control system and with various NATO systems.
The main sites for command and control of
Trident submarines include Criggion, Rugby, Anthorn
and Inskip. These sites normally consist of radio
masts and little else. Radio masts are easily taken
down through the removal of the odd bolt here and there
or through the severing of the wires that hold them
up but be very careful where and how they fall. Some
of these sites also have civilian uses so caution and
the gathering of information prior to any action should
be used to ensure the right masts are rendered inoperable.
Pitreavie (HQ of RN Flag Office for Scotland
and Northern Ireland); Bristol (MOD Procurement HQ)
and Bath (RN Procurement HQ) are key
administrative centres.
Sites on St Kilda and Uists monitor missile - but
not Trident missile - tests.
The massive US spy base at Menwith Hill
in Yorkshire has links with the radio transmission station near
Rugby, now run by BT on behalf of the MoD. Menwith Hill is a vital part of the US’
worldwide intelligence gathering network and is linked into
the Command and Control system for Trident.
All new British submarines, including the
Tridents, undergo sonar and torpedo trials east of
Skye. These are monitored by BUTEC (British Underwater Test
and Evaluation Centre) whose administrative base is
at Kyle of Lochalsh with range operations control
sites at Rona and Applecross.
Emergency (Z) berths for submarines are dotted along the West coast of Scotland, including
Coulport, Loch Goil, Loch Ewe, Rothesay and
Skye. In England there are Z berths in Plymouth Sound,
Spithead, Southampton, Cardiff and Liverpool.
Devonport Royal Dockyard in
Plymouth is currently undergoing a £350 million dock
expansion in preparation for re-fitting HMS Vanguard in
early 2002. The other submarines will then follow suit.
Loch Goil is also a noise range which is used
to listen to the noise generated by individual vessels.
It is used on a regular basis by Trident and other submarines.
Cove - there is an electronic range off Cove which
is regularly used by Trident and other submarines.
Loch Long, South of Coulport, is used regularly
for submarine trials.
The area of water between Arran and
Bute is used for submarine diving trials, mostly at weekends.
UK Trident Sites
References and Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Faslane Peace campers and various
CND members who gave advice and help as well as to
Faslane and Coulport security and police for opportunities
for practical experience! This section was updated
with the help of Lionel Trippett, John Ainslie, Clive
Fudge and Joe Button.
5.1 Background information on Trident, Faslane
and Coulport
Trident Resister’s Handbook - Bob Aldridge.
Trident - 30 years of the Polaris Sales
Agreement - Ministry of Defence 1993.
5.2 How to safely disarm a Trident submarine
The Safety of Trident - an assessment of the
radiation risks associated with the UK Trident
programme - John Ainslie, Scottish CND, February 1994.
Safe in our Hands? RNAD Coulport - Faslane Peace
Camp and Scottish CND, 15th July 1993.
We all live in a Nuclear Submarine - Article and
diagram in Radio Times, 10-16th August 1996.
5.3 Background information on Aldermaston
and Burghfield
This section was written by Ippy.
5.4 Other Trident related sites
Nuclear Scotland in the 1990s - Scottish CND.
Main Trident Sites in the UK - CND.
All articles in this section
| 
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