Government and Military

10/5/00

Dear Tony Blair, Ref: Strengthening the Rule of International Law. We write once again to you as the Head of the UK Government to remind you that you have the prime responsibility for the stated readiness to use the 100 kiloton nuclear warheads that are presently deployed on the Trident system. We thank you for your reply, through Stephen Willmer of the Ministry of Defence, dated 2 March 2000.

Once again however, we find ourselves frustrated by your unwillingness to answer, in any meaningful way, the core question that we have been putting to you and your Government since our first Open Letter to you on 18 March 1998. In simple language this is:- Given the likely consequences of any use of a 100 kiloton nuclear weapon, under what circumstances could it ever be used lawfully even in an extreme circumstance of self-defence?

You state that ’The threshold for legitimate use of nuclear weapons clearly is, and should be, a very high one’, but you refuse to define what this threshold is. You state that a determination of ’the legality of the use of nuclear weapons ... would take into account the consequences of use of a particular nuclear weapon at a specific time and place’, but say, ’there is no useful benefit to be gained from hypothetical speculation on where precisely the dividing line would lie’.

It is incumbent on the government to explain how a weapon with a yield of approximately 100 kilotons could be used without breaking one of the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law. In the absence of such an explanation one must assume that it would be ’incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets" [Para 78 of the ICJ Advisory Opinion]. It is in the nature of any event in the hypothetical future that its timing and location cannot be forecast. However, there is a strong presumption that any foreseeable use of Trident would be unlawful.

We accept Government assurances that the warheads are no longer targeted, but would point out that they can be re-targeted at short notice. We are therefore not talking in a vacuum but about your present contingency plans for the use of Trident. Publicly available information makes it quite clear that many of these targets are likely to be in, or close to, population centres.

For instance, it is understood that British targeting doctrine is harmonized with that of NATO and the United States. United States documents available under Freedom of Information have identified the likely targets for nuclear strikes as being:-

- ’WMD and their delivery systems, as well as associated command and control, production, and logistical support units
  Ground combat units and their associated command and control and support units
  Air defense facilities and support installations
  Naval installations, combat vessels, and associated support facilities and command and control capabilities
  Nonstate actors (facilities and operations centers) that possess WMD
  Underground facilities.’ [US Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, ’Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations’, Joint Pub 3-12.1, 9 February 1996].

Similarly, US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations states that :- ’several strategies or factors must be considered in planning joint nuclear operations:

  Countervalue Targeting... the destruction or neutralization of selected enemy military and military-related activities, such as industries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to the enemy’s ability to wage war...
  Counterforce Targeting... typical counterforce targets include bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, C2 [command and control] centers, and WMD storage facilities...[US Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, ’Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations’, Joint Pub 3-12, 18 December 1995].

Most of us know where such military targets are. Many are close to or inside major population centres. This would make the use of Trident "scarcely reconcilable" with the "principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict" [Para 95 of t he ICJ Advisory Opinion].

When you say that’secrecy in this area plays an important part in enabling the United Kingdom to maintain a credible minimum deterrent at the lowest possible level’ we have to presume that this secrecy includes secrecy about the Government’s legal assesment of its nuclear weapons policy. If the Government’s assessment of the legality of its nuclear contingency plans is a secret, it then follows that just such an assessment has been made, contradicting your claim that "there is no useful benefit to be gained from hypothetical speculation on where precisely the dividing line would lie". While it may be valid to keep the detail of battle plans a secret the legality of nuclear policy concerns us all and should be open to public exmination and debate. This is especially true for military personnel who would be involved in any violation of the law caused by the use of a Trident warhead.

The Government’s continuing refusal to clarify its legal justification for the use of Trident gives the impression that it would in some conditions be willing to use them, even if this means breaking international law. It cannot be expected that in the heat and pressure of a war detailed legal scrutiny will take place and strict adherence to international law be observed if there has not already been a thorough examination of these issues in a time of peace. The awkward questions must be answered now, otherwise one of the basic checks on ensuring lawful actions would have been removed. Responsible global citizens are questioning at this very moment the government’s claim that its nuclear policy can be reconciled with the law. In the interests of peace and the international legal order we deserve answers. Secrecy may be seen as essential for nuclear deterrence but it undermines the rule of international law, long-term stability in the world and prospects for global nuclear disarmament.

It may be useful to remind you of the words of General Lee Butler. As Commander of Strategic Nuclear Forces in the US he was allowed full access to the war plan and was shocked to see ’it was defined by 12,500 targets in the former Warsaw Pact’. On examining each of these targets individually, he said that the war plan was the ’most absurd and irreponsible document’ he had ever reviewed and realized that ’we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust’ mainly by chance. It had taken him 30 years to understand the true magnitude and implications of the US targeting plans and he concluded that he ’had the responsibility to be at the forefront of the effort to begin to close the nuclear age’. [General Lee Butler’s Address to the Canadian Network Against nuclear Weapons on 3/11/99].

We need to know that our Commanders in the UK are also given the opportunity, out of the heat of battle, to examine in detail all of the UK targets and the various war scenarios and plans, and to know that this is done in the light of the intransgressible cardinal principles of international humanitarian law.

Again you say that you are not prepared to meet us. This is not a very productive response. Diplomacy is a very important part of conflict resolution and regardless of the starting positions of the parties it is always productive to talk. This is true on the domestic as well as the international level. We notice that you are willing to negotiate with self-confessedly violent groups for the sake of peace in Northern Ireland. Refusing to meet peaceful nuclear disarmers, who present a threat to nobody, could all too easily be interpreted as a reward for those willing to use bloodshed to achieve their ends.

One reason for not engaging in direct talks may be that you feel you are on very weak legal and moral ground or that you are not prepared to change your policies even if they are illegal. This suspicion is augmented by the fact that the Government refuses to discuss the issue even with those with the highest credentials and who are totally unconnected with direct action. In the summer of 1999 George Robertson, then Minister of Defence, declined to meet a delegation containing MPs and lawyers, including Lord Murray, a former Lord Advocate of Scotland, on the grounds that he could see no useful purpose in it. But regardless of your real reasons for not wishing to engage in any face to face discussions with us we continue to assure you of our willingness to meet and urge you to agree to talk directly to us.

During this most important time of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons we would point out that after 30 years it is time for the UK to fulfil its promise to the world community and to engage in meaningful nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile, we will be at Aldermaston - the heart of the UK nuclear weapon establishment - engaging in people’s disarmament in our usual open, accountable, safe and nonviolent manner. We have enclosed a list of the current 161 global citizens who have Pledged to Prevent Nuclear Crime.

In peace and love,

Kathryn Amos, Morag Balfour, Sylvia Boyes, Maggie Charnley, Alison Crane, Marilyn Croser, Helen Harris, David Mackenzie, Joy Mitchell, Brian Quail, Jane Tallents, and Angie Zelter.

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