Government and Military

23/3/1999.

Dear Tony Blair,

Ref: Request that you take over our disarmament work and decommission all British nuclear weapons. We wrote our first Open Letter to you over a year ago requesting urgent discussions regarding the necessity to take immediate steps towards disarming British nuclear weapons and moving towards a non-nuclear defence policy ’in accordance with the international obligations and legal and humanitarian norms which apply to this country’. We pointed out that nuclear weapons are not consistent with your Government’s stated ’ethical foreign policy’ nor is nuclear ’deterrence’ a feasible or credible defence policy. We outlined why we felt that ’the ICJ effectively delegitimised nuclear deterrence postures’ and why we were most concerned about your interpretation of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and your continuing reliance on nuclear weapons. We found that the post-Cold War ’sub-strategic’ mission for Trident was ’mistaken, incoherent and incompatible with international humanitarian law’. We stated that the possession of nuclear weapons is also ’totally incompatible with any common global ethics’ and that ’the deployment of Trident misuses resources that should be devoted to the real security challenges facing us in the new millennium: from systemic poverty to widespread environmental degradation, to proliferation and international terrorism, among others’. [Ref.1].

Since our first open Letter we have written six further letters asking for considered replies to several serious questions and problems that we have raised. We have received no substantive response. Nor have our offers of meetings been taken up. We urge you to be properly accountable, as our elected Prime Minister, and to give us answers as soon as possible. Since our first open letter the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has been published. The Labour Government can be congratulated for emphasising humanitarian response capabilities and defence diplomacy. On nuclear policy, however, the SDR has failed to reflect the post Cold War international relations, norms and aspirations. Although the SDR contains welcome initiatives on nuclear policies, such as transparency of military nuclear materials and reducing the alert status of Trident, it counterproductively reinforces the role of Trident as a ’necessary element of our security’. [Ref.2].

Also since our first Open Letter to you, India and Pakistan have emulated nuclear armed countries like Britain by conducting nuclear test explosions, in defiance of the anti-testing norm established by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty even before it enters into force. Britain, together with the other declared nuclear weapon states swiftly condemned the tests and called on India and Pakistan not to deploy nuclear weapons, nor test delivery vehicles. Please explain to us why these weapons that you consider necessary for our security are not necessary for the security of India and Pakistan? If they have security alternatives to nuclear weapons, don’t we? In June 1998, Britain hosted a G-8 meeting to respond to the South Asian nuclear tests. The G-8 communique reinforced the nuclear weapon states’ obligations in a paragraph referring not only to Article VI of the NPT, but also to the commitments undertaken in 1995 when the NPT was indefinitelyextended, to pursue ’systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally’. Yet on several occasions Britain has failed to act constructively or positively in international fora when other (non-nuclear) governments have proposed steps that could be undertaken to help make progress. Britain supports a ban on the future production of fissile materials for weapons but has refused to reduce its own existing stocks. Nor has Britain expressed support for any of the many proposals on nuclear disarmament now before the Conference on Disarmament. In December 1998, Britain voted against most of the UN General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament, including one based on the June 9

Statement of Foreign Ministers of eight non-nuclear countries. Although two EU countries were among the sponsors of the resolution ’Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda’ [Ref.3], Britain joined the United States and France in trying to bully European Members of NATO into opposing the resolution, despite the fact that the resolution called only for further unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions and for the nuclear weapons states and their allies to ’review strategic doctrines’. Although this resolution was entirely consistent with our legal obligations, Britain justified voting against by saying that the resolution advocated measures which had been examined in the SDR and ’which we concluded are, at the present time, inconsistent with the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent’ [Ref.4]. Over 180 countries renounced the possibility of relying on such a ’minimum deterrent’ when they joined the NPT, which has been made permanent and given strengthened safeguards. At a time when we should be trying to set a positive example of non-proliferation, restraint and disarmament, how can you justify voting against moderate attempts to make progress in the international arena? As our questions below make clear, we do not accept that in a predominantly non-nuclear world Britain (or anyone else) has the right to nuclear weapons. We reject the concept of minimum deterrence, and even were such a concept coherent, we fail to see how Trident could qualify as such, even with ’only’ 48 warheads per boat as the SDR promised. The major questions still unanswered include the following to which we await a reasoned response:-

1) How can the threat to use a nuclear warhead of up to 100 kilotons be consistent with international humanitarian law which specifies the

necessity to be able to distinguish between military and civilian targets, which prohibits unnecessary suffering to combatants, prohibits widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment and specifies the inviolability of neutral nations?

a) If Trident is not illegal then will the Government please furnish us with even one detailed example of how, where and when a 100 kiloton Trident nuclear warhead could be used lawfully?

b) One probable target is Yulyamy, a town in northern Russia, close to the border with Norway. It has a population of over 28,000 and it is close to several Russian Navy shipyards which are used to repair nuclear powered submarines. A Trident warhead exploding in the air above the shipyard would create a fireball 870 metres across. The town would be completely flattened. Around 90% of the population would be killed by a combination of radiation, extreme heat and collapsing buildings. The death toll would probably include around 7000 children. The explosion would destroy schools, hospitals and churches. The few survivors would all be seriously injured. Even 4.5 kms from the explosion, anyone in the open would suffer from third degree burns. There would be extensive blast damage and hundreds of casualties in the town of Severomorsk, 10 km away. All this is to say nothing of the extensive secondary radiation which would effect the

inhabitants of Norway. On any interpretation of international law it is perplexing to see how this could be legal. Can you assure us that Yulyamy, or any similar places are not on your target lists?

c) When will you institute a public legal review of the targets that the Trident warheads, of unverifiable but variable yields of up to 100

kilotons, would be used against? In our opinion no currently deployed nuclear weapon on Trident could possibly be used against any land-based target without substantially breaching international humanitarian law - they are just too inhumane and terrible with uncontrollable long-term genetic and environmental effects spread over time and space.

2) Given the power and accuracy of conventional forces that could be used in conformity with international law why does the British Government consider nuclear weapons to be ’the ultimate guarantee of the UK’s security’?

3) The Strategic Defence Review [Ref.2] states that ’The Government is nevertheless unequivocally committed to Britain’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.’ However, the ICJ Advisory Opinion interpreted this as an obligation to ’bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects’. How does this square with the UK’s defence policy where ’our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security’ (paragraph 60); ’We need to ensure that it can remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years’ (paragraph 62); and describing Trident as ’a capability of such vital importance to our security’ (paragraph 75)? If you wanted to indicate a commitment to rid the world of nuclear weapons then you should have made a declaration not to replace Trident instead of saying ’it would be premature to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident should this prove necessary’. The NPT was negotiated 30 years ago. How much longer do we have to wait for Britain to carry out its obligations? The World Court stated quite clearly that this obligation ’goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects’.

a) In the Strategic Defence Review, the government stated ’The end of the Cold War has transformed our security environment. The world does not live in the shadow of World War. There is no longer a direct threat to Western Europe or the United Kingdom as we used to know it, and we face no significant threat to any of our Overseas Territories.’ As the survival of the UK is not presently under threat, the present threat by the UK to use nuclear weapons, represented by its deployment of Trident, is unlawful. If the Government were to counter this by arguing that a direct threat to British survival might re-emerge at some future date, it would be in effect arguing that it could never agree to eliminate its nuclear weapons - a clear violation of its NPT undertakings.

4) Nuclear weapons are pivotal in national and international affairs because they have such a capacity to undermine our integrity as human beings. They reach into the very heart of humanitarian law. If we allow or legitimise the use of nuclear weapons for any reason whatsoever, if our society, our leaders, can justify the mass destruction of women, children and other civilians then how can we coherently, consistently or rationally disallow any lesser evil? How, therefore, can you assert that Trident is an ethical contribution to British security? In our first open Letter we informed you that in the absence of a clear commitment by your Government to disarm British nuclear weapons by January1st 2000 and implement a non-nuclear security policy and in view of the urgency of the task, we were initiating Trident Ploughshares 2000 (TP2000). This project is based around a Pledge to Prevent Nuclear Crime and is now well under way.

As promised, TP2000 was launched on May 2nd 1998 in Edinburgh, Gent, Gothenburg, Hiroshima, and London. The first open and publicly advertised disarmament actions took place in August 1998 when 100 global citizens were arrested after breaching security at the Faslane and Coulport base many times. Since then two more open disarmament events have taken place at Faslane and our ’secret’ but still fully accountable and nonviolent disarmament actions are now beginning and are taking place at variable times and places. On Monday February 1st 1999 two TP2000 Pledgers swam up to HMS Vengeance (docked at Barrow) climbed aboard and painted slogans and then disarmed testing equipment on the conning tower before entering the submarine. More such actions are planned for the coming months.

That such actions, even after our repeated warnings, are so easy, makes a mockery of the security of these nuclear weapons and highlights once again the unconscionable danger we are all in and indicates that nuclear weapons are not really about defending British people from attack but are an increasingly dangerous, anachronistic, status symbol. To date 173 global citizens from 12 different nations have been arrested and are slowly proceeding through the courts of Scotland and England where they are arguing that their peaceful, safe and accountable practical disarmament of the British Trident-based nuclear weapons system is in accordance with international law and our responsibilities as global citizens to try to prevent nuclear crime. Commander Gillespie [Ref:5] states that ’Trident Ploughshares has stated publicly and on a number of occasions, intentions to commit criminal acts’. However, we totally refute that we are engaged in any criminal acts whatsoever.

We are merely trying to uphold international law and prevent the Government from continuing to engage in what we believe are criminal acts on a massive scale. Customary international law has evolved over centuries to protect neutral countries, innocent bystanders, and the environment from the excesses of war. These laws were the basic legal premises used to condemn those Nazis responsible for the holocaust. These laws are now being applied at the War Crimes Tribunals in The Hague where leaders and officials implicated in the atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are being prosecuted.

The UK Government is right to condemn those who violate these basic norms and standards of humane behaviour, but it still has to accept its own culpability under them and to apply these same norms and standards to its deployment of weapons capable of annihilating millions of people and destroying entire eco-systems. This is pertinent to another Government statement in letters to us where we are told that ’it is totally unacceptable’ to directly encourage ’service personnel to refuse to carry out their legal duties’. This again misses the point that these service personnel are being misled as to the law and that it is the UK Government that is giving them unlawful orders, the effect of which is to make them complicit in major and extremely serious breaches of customary international law. It is our duty to inform all service personnel of the Nuremberg Principles and to remind them that they must never obey unlawful orders. We will continue with these warnings and with our disarmament actions. However, as always, we leave the door open to any discussions and meetings that the government is able to arrange.

Yours sincerely,

Morag Balfour, Sylvia Boyes, David Mackenzie, Joy Mitchell, Brian Quail, Jane Tallents, Ian Thomson, Rachel Wenham, and Angie Zelter.

CC:- HM Queen Elizabeth; Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Secretary for Defence; Attorney General; Lord Advocate; Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jock Slater, all Captains of the Trident Submarines and Rear Admirals of FOSNNI and FOSM.

References

[1] Respect the Law: Dismantle Trident - An Open Letter to Tony Blair from Trident Ploughshares dated 18/3/98.

[2] The Strategic Defence Review, CM3999, The Stationery Office, London, July 1998, section on Deterrence and Disarmament’, pp 17-20.

[3] UNGA 53/77Y.

[4] Ambassador Ian Soutar, 13th November, 1998, as quoted in R.Johnson, First Committee Report, Disarmament Diplomacy 32, November 1998.

[5] Letter of 5/8/98 to Angie Zelter from Simon Gillespie, Commander Royal Navy - reported in TP2000’s Dialogue and Negotiation Work - Summary of 23/2/99 by Angie Zelter.

The criteria for halting Trident Ploughshares are: Trident Ploughshares 2000 will halt its activities if the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, or Secretary of State for Defence, gives us a written undertaking or makes a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all British nuclear weapons will be disarmed by 1st January 2000 and that the government is committed to implementing a non-nuclear security policy. We recognise that such an undertaking would be a process consisting both of operational changes, which the government could direct the Ministry of Defence to implement immediately without reference to any other governments or negotiations, and policy changes that will require international negotiations and consultations with foreign suppliers and allies.

Trident Ploughshares 2000 will be prepared to halt our direct activities as long as we are satisfied that genuine progress towards disarming Britain’s nuclear capability is being made, but we will resume if undertakings are reversed or unreasonably drawn out or postponed. We regard the following visible and verifiable elements as indispensable to genuine commitment by the government to a process of de-nuclearising Britain. i) The British Trident submarine system must immediately be taken off 24-hour patrols. ii) No new Trident missiles are to be purchased from the United States. iii) All British nuclear warheads must be removed from their delivery systems and stored separately by 1st January 2000.

iv) No further deployment of US nuclear weapons in Britain. Britain should work with its NATO allies and Russia for withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and for establishment of a policy not to use nuclear weapons first or against non-nuclear-armed adversaries in any circumstances.

v) Trident missiles are to be returned to the United States and the warheads to be returned to AWE Aldermaston/Burghfield by an agreed date.

vi) Commitment to a timetable for the decommissioning of British nuclear weapons as fast as is feasible and safe, with a target date for completion of 2010 at the latest.

vii) Pledge not to replace Trident or seek to acquire nuclear weapons again.

viii) Conversion of Britain’s nuclear weapon facilities from research and development for the maintenance and production of the nuclear arsenal towards the decommissioning of nuclear weapons and facilities, safe management and disposal of nuclear materials under strict and effective national and international safeguards and controls, and the enhanced verification of international agreements on weapons of mass destruction.

ix) Active and constructive British involvement in the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the goal of negotiating interim agreements leading to a nuclear weapons convention as early as possible. The genuineness and constructiveness of this commitment will be gauged from the positions taken by Britain in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, the Conference on Disarmament, five-power talks, NATO, and other related fora.

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