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Government and Military

From Philip Barton, Private Secretary to Tony Blair, 9th July 1999

From the Private Secretary,

10 DOWNING STREET LONDON SW1A 2AA

9 July 1999

Dear Ms. Zelter,

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 14 May, enclosing a copy of your open letter of 23 March.

The Government has made clear on numerous occasions its commitment to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But this goal cannot be achieved in isolation from wider political and security realities. As the Government set out in its Strategic Defense Review (SDR), its challenge is to create the conditions in which no state judges that it needs nuclear weapon to guarantee its security. The world would be a better place if nuclear weapons were not still necessary, but the conditions for this do not yet exist. The Government has radically reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons, but in present conditions it, together with out NATO Allies, judges that nuclear deterrence still has an important contribution to make in insuring against the re-emergence of major strategic military threats, in preventing nuclear coercion and in preserving peace and stability in Europe.

It is essential to stop nuclear proliferation to attain the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have moved the other way. Neither their interests nor those of any other country in the world are served by encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. Nor does the Government believe that the security of either India or Pakistan has been increased by their nuclear tests. There is a clear international consensus that both should sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, enter into negotiation of a Treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Government has said that when it is satisfied with verified progress towards the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in negotiations. Many of the national measures announced in the SDR will help lay the ground for this, These include the reduction in the size of the United Kingdom’s deterrent; greater transparency about our nuclear and fissile material stockpiles: reducing our military stockpile by placing fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards; reprocessing of spent fuel from the defence Chapelcross reactors under international safeguards; beginning of a national historical accounting for fissile material produced; and beginning of a programme to develop British expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally.

The Government is willing to consider any proposals that it believes can make a constructive contribution towards nuclear disarmament. At last year’s meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, it considered carefully a number of resolutions on nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom supported resolutions tabled by Japan on the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, by the United States and Russia on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, and by a number of countries on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. The Government was unable to support a range of other resolutions which, in its view, did not take into account the complexities of the issues involved in nuclear disarmament, and did not offer credible and practical measures towards that goal.

The next generally agreed key priority is negotiation of a verifiable, legally binding convention banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This is universally recognised to offer the prospect of substantial, meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom is pressing for the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva of an Ad-Hoc Committee to negotiate such a Treaty. We are urging all States at the CD to break the current deadlock over its programme of work. The Government is prepared to give serious consideration to any proposal that will bring this about provided it commands consensus. With this in mind the United Kingdom, United States and France put forward a possible solution in May for consideration by the CD, including an enhanced mechanism to work for consensus on how the CD should take forward consideration of nuclear disarmament.

The Government is confident that the United Kingdom’s defensive deterrent posture is consistent with international law. There is no question of military personnel and civilian officials engaged in support of the United Kingdom’s nuclear capability acting illegally. The Government has made clear that it would consider the use of nuclear weapons only in self defence and in extreme circumstances. The United Kingdom has always maintained that the use of nuclear weapons, like other weapons, would be subject to the requirements of international law, and humanitarian law, applicable in armed conflict. The Government has also consistently judged that the legality or otherwise of any use of nuclear weapons can only be determined in the light of all the circumstances applying at the time such use is being considered. Speculating on particular hypothetical cases serves no useful purpose.

Legal advice from the Government’s legal advisers, was available to Ministers and senior officers and officials in considering, within the Strategic Defence Review, the nuclear options that might be needed to maintain a credible minimum deterrent throughout the life of Trident. Legal advice would be available to Ministers if circumstances were extreme enough for us ever to have to consider the use of nuclear weapons to defend ourselves from attack. The Government is satisfied that the arrangements to ensure informed legal advice in such circumstances are fully adequate.

Trident Ploughshares 2000’s letter suggests that the ability of demonstrators to reach the casing of HMS Vengeance at Barrow on 1 February, or other submarines on other occasions, calls into question the security of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons. HMS Vengeance is, however, not yet operational, and the demonstrators were readily apprehended and safely conducted from the scene (as they have been when they have tried to gain access to other submarines). The security arrangements were thereby demonstrated as being perfectly adequate, as well as providing for the proper duty of care to the public, including demonstrators. There was no question of any compromise of the security of nuclear weapons.

As its record shows, the Government is willing to meet representatives of a wide range of organisations advocating particular views. It consulted very widely in the Strategic Defence Review. including those advocating immediate unilateral British nuclear disarmament. It strongly supports the right of anyone to demonstrate peacefully in support of causes in which they believe. It does not believe, however. that it would be right to arrange meetings such as you have requested while Trident Ploughshares 2000 is not prepared to confine itself to legitimate and peaceful means of protest.

Yours sincerely

PHILIP BARTON


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