Government and Military

TRIDENT PLOUGHSHARES DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION

Replies to open letter to Gordon Brown of 21/4/09

18 May 2009 Letter from Direct Communications Unit, 10 Downing Street.

Dear Ms Crane

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you and your co-signatories for your recent letter.

As you can imagine, Mr Brown receives thousands of letters each week and regrets that he is unable to reply personally to them all.

I have been asked to forward your letter to the Ministry of Defence so that they may reply to you direct.

Yours sincerely

Mr R Smith

Copies of the letter were also sent to Rt. Hon. John Hutton MP,Secretary of State for Defence Rt. Hon. David Miliband MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP, Leader of Conservative Party Rt. Hon. Nick Clegg MP, Leader of Liberal Democrat party Rt. Hon. Alex Salmond MP MSP First Minister of Scotland and Leader of Scottish Nationalist Party Dr Caroline Lucas MEP, Leader of Green Party of England & Wales Robin Harper MSP and Cllr Alison Johnstone, Co-convenors of Scottish Green Party

REPLIES

Post Card from Rt Hon David Cameron MP, Leader of the Opposition

David Cameron acknowledges with thanks the receipt of your communication the contents of which have been noted.

Card from Caroline Lucas MEP Green Party

Thank you for your correspondence, your comments have been noted. Plus a hand written note “Thank you for sending a copy of your letter and please keep up the wonderful work.” From: Dr Glenn Kelly Counter Proliferation and Security Cooperation MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 04.N.06, Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2MB Telephone (Switchboard) 02072189000 (Fax) 02072186360

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From: Dr Glenn Kelly Counter Proliferation and Security Cooperation MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 11June 2009

Dear Trident Ploughshares Thank you for your letter, dated 21 April 2009 which was sent to the Prime Minister raising several points on the UK’s nuclear policy. He has passed it to the Ministry of Defence and I have been asked to respond. I will try to respond to each of your substantive points in turn, though for clarity some points are addressed more appropriately in conjunction with others.

The UK’s record in reducing its arsenal to the minimum required to maintain a credible deterrent is substantial and we have undertaken a large number of unilateral and multilateral efforts in support of this. For instance, the UK has cut the explosive power of its nuclear weapons by 75 per cent since the end of the Cold War and we have reduced our stockpile to fewer than 160 operationally available nuclear warheads. We have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and call regularly all on all states that have not yet done so to do the same (particularly those whose ratification is required before the Treaty can enter into force). We are very pleased that member states at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have recently agreed to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty.

The decision to maintain our minimum nuclear deterrent in no way contradicts the UK’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a Nuclear Weapon State the treaty does not require the UK to disarm unilaterally nor does it prohibit the maintenance of existing deterrent systems. You suggested that Trident is being "upgraded". Whilst we will naturally take advantage of the latest technology to yet further improve the safety, security and reliability of the UK deterrent, there is no "upgrade" in the manner which I believe you are implying. As the UK Ambassador and Head of Delegation to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee made clear in his statement:

"Any suggestion that the UK is further developing its nuclear weapons is a misunderstanding. The UK is retaining not_modernising its deterrent There is no change in the capabilities of the system, ng_move to produce more useable weapons andno_change in nuclear posture or doctrine. The UK’s nuclear weapon system will not be designed for war-fighting use in military campaigns. It is a strategic deterrent that we would only ever contemplate using in extreme circumstances of self-defence."

Nevertheless, the Government does not advocate the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. While the decision will allow the UK to maintain a continuous deterrent capability, we will do so only for as long as national security requires. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that unilateral disarmament by the UK will have any material effect on encouraging other nuclear armed states to disarm or those states seeking nuclear weapons to stop. However, as Margaret Beckett said on 24 June 2007, and repeated more recently by the Prime Minister on 17 March 2009, once it is useful for our arsenal to be included in broader multilateral disarmament negotiations, we will willingly do so.

Promoting and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty is central to this commitment. We are working intensively with international partners to identify areas of convergence that can form the basis of a successful outcome to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, thereby furthering the multilateral disarmament agenda.

In terms of the cost of maintaining the UK nuclear deterrent, it is important to set the sums involved in context. In the 2006 White Paper, we estimated that the procurement costs of the new submarines and associated equipment and infrastructure will be in the region of £15-20 billion (at 2006-07 prices) for a four-boat fleet, mainly spread over the period 2012-27. As the Prime Minister told the House of Commons in his National Security Strategy statement on 19 March 2008, "The primary duty of government - our abiding obligation - is, and will always be, the safety of all British people and the protection of the British national interest1 and, when comparing the current threats to those of recent history, that the "potential threats we face come from far less predictable sources: both state and non-state". For more than 50 years our independent nuclear deterrent has provided the ultimate assurance of our national security. The Government believes that the investment in a capability of such vital importance to our national security is one that as a nation we can and should afford, whilst also continuing to invest in other priorities, such as measures to tackle poverty, climate change, health, housing and law and order, including the fight against terrorism.

Turning to your points on NATO; its strategy, as embodied in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, is one of war prevention. To that end, deterrence is one of the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks. The proven success of this strategy has depended, and will continue to depend, on the capabilities and the appropriate mix of Alliance forces, including nuclear forces, and on the effectiveness and credibility of NATO’s deterrent posture. Nevertheless since 1991 NATO has reduced the types and numbers of its sub-strategic nuclear forces by over 85 percent. The Alliance has declared its reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and has stated that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by Allies are extremely remote.

The option to adopt a "No First Use" position was examined during the UK Strategic Defence Review, but rejected on the basis that it would be incompatible with our and NATO’s doctrine of deterrence, and that it would not further nuclear disarmament objectives. The UK and NATO therefore leave this question open and do not determine in advance how to react to aggression. This would be decided in the context of all circumstances prevailing at the time. In so doing, we seek to create uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the response to aggression against the UK or our Allies and ensure, as far as possible, that we would never have to use our nuclear weapons at all.

The UK remains fully committed to our Negative Security Assurance as we gave in 1995, and repeated at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to non-nuclear weapon states. This states that, "The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its Armed Forces, its Allies or on a State towards which it has a security

commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear weapons State." On dealerting, the UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review announced that our submarines on deterrent patrol are at a reduced day-to-day alert state, reflecting improved strategic conditions. Moreover, the missiles are no longer targeted at any country (they have been de-targeted since 1994). This position was considered and re-affirmed during the work on the 2006 White Paper which stated that our submarine on deterrent patrol is normally at several days notice to fire. We believe that a nuclear attack on the UK’s vital interests is deterred by demonstrating our capability to respond under any circumstances, rather than just by an ability for a rapid response. There is no immediacy of launch in our normal operating posture.

Related to the issue of dealerting, you also suggest storing warheads on shore. The removal of warheads from missiles would add a vulnerability to the United Kingdom’s deterrent posture, which is of particular concern given the reduction to a single nuclear system. The UK has decided that an invulnerable and undetectable system allows us to maintain our nuclear deterrent at a minimum level of scale and readiness. Any increase in vulnerabilities could require an increase in the scale and readiness of our deterrent. You also suggest abandoning continuous at sea deterrence (CASD). The rationale for CASD patrolling (which the UK has maintained since 1969, and mirrors how the US and France operate their SSBNs) is that the submarine on patrol is invulnerable to an attack. For example, we are confident that our SSBNs on deterrent patrol have remained completely undetected by a hostile or potentially hostile state. This means we have an assured nuclear deterrent available at all times. If we ceased continuous deterrent patrols, we could be deterred or prevented from deploying an SSBN in a crisis. Finally, you raise the concept of minimum deterrence. UK nuclear policy of minimum deterrence means that we maintain the minimum level of nuclear weapons required to guarantee a credible deterrent against any potential aggressor. This is provided by our one nuclear weapons system - Trident. Our fleet of four Vanguard Class SSBNs - HMS VANGUARD, VIGILANT, VICTORIOUS and VENGEANCE - enables us to maintain a CASD patrol.

The process by which we make an assessment of our minimum deterrent requirements is described in paragraph 4-9 of the 2006 White Paper. We make an assessment of the minimum destructive capability that we need to be able to deliver in order to outweigh the potential benefits a potential aggressor might believe they would derive from an attack on our vital interests. This includes an assessment of the decision-making processes of future potential aggressors and of defensive measures that a potential adversary might employ in an effort to reduce the impact of the UK’s nuclear capability. I hope this is helpful.

Thank you for your letter, dated 21 April 2009 which was sent to the Prime Minister, concerning the UK’s nuclear deterrent. It has been passed to the Ministry of Defence and I have been asked to reply. You called on the Prime Minister to "finally comply with the NPT" - the UK is in full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. Article VI states that "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." It does not require the UK to disarm unilaterally nor does it set a timetable for disarmament.

The Government is fully committed to its obligations under Article VI and believes in the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons and has taken steps towards achieving this vision. For instance, the UK has cut the explosive power of its nuclear weapons by 75 per cent since the end of the Cold War and we now have fewer than 160 operationally available nuclear warheads. We have reduced to a single delivery platform, the Vanguard class of submarine. We have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and call regularly all on all states that have not yet done so to do the same (particularly those whose ratification is required before the Treaty can enter into force). We are also working hard for the start of negotiation without pre-conditions on a Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We are engaged in work with a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (Norway) and an NGO (VERTIC) in order to address some of the technical challenges associated with the verification of nuclear disarmament and we have offered to host a P5 conference later this year on multilateral disarmament.

The UK is widely considered to be the most forward leaning of the Nuclear Weapon States on disarmament issues and much of the progress outlined above has been made in the eleven years since your first letter to the Foreign Secretary. These measures demonstrate a clear effort to work towards a world free from nuclear weapons. However, a government’s first duty is, and will always be, the safety of its people and the protection of their interests and thus we must also consider the wider strategic context. The 2003 Defence White Paper: "Delivering Security in a Changing World" described the nature of the security challenges facing the United Kingdom and the defence response to them. The paper highlighted the complex and inter-related threats posed by international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the range of risks associated with weak and failing states. We expect these to remain the security priorities for the UK. However, we also recognise that there are a number of pressures which may complicate or exacerbate this picture up to and beyond 2020, and that unexpected strategic shocks might also alter these priorities. We have therefore developed balanced and flexible armed forces which are able to respond to the inherent uncertainty of the future. This assessment informed the December 2006 White Paper, ’The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent". The Government therefore took the decision to maintain the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

This decision is fully consistent with our obligations as a recognised Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT. The Treaty does not require unilateral disarmament nor does it establish a timetable for multilateral disarmament. Neither does the Treaty prohibit the maintenance of nuclear weapon systems currently held by any NWS. Your letter suggests three practical steps that the UK could take in order to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. The UK has neither a "First Use" nor a "No First Use" nuclear weapons policy - the option to adopt a "No First Use" position has been rejected on the basis that it would be incompatible with our doctrine of deterrence. The UK does determine in advance how to react to aggression. This would be decided in the context of all circumstances prevailing at the time. In so doing, we seek to create uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the response to aggression against the UK or our Allies and ensure, as far as possible, that we would never have to use our nuclear weapons at all. You also suggested that we should store our warheads ashore or cease continuous deterrence patrols. Both of these suggestions are impractical for two reasons. Firstly they would introduce an unacceptable vulnerability to our deterrent. When the decision was taken to reduce to a single platform the basis for doing so was that submarines are invulnerable as they are undetectable while on patrol. If the submarines either had to return to port to arm with warheads or were not routinely on patrol then this would increase their vulnerability. Secondly both of these options would create new risks of crisis escalation should it be necessary for the submarines to sail or arm with warheads in times of rising tension.

You also asked that we clearly state that the deterrent would only be used as "a hedge against a specifically nuclear attack on the United Kingdom". Britain has repeatedly made it clear that we will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state not in material breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, unless it attacks us, our Allies or a state to which we have a security commitment, in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state. Finally I would like to reiterate that the UK is fully committed to the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons but this is a process that will require a number of intermediate steps. The Government is pursuing these with vigour and is doing all that it can to progress the multilateral disarmament agenda. I hope this is helpful.

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