3. Dialogue with the state

Tri-denting It Handbook, 3rd Ed (2001) Part 3 Dialogue With The State

Contents

3.1 Why Dialogue?

3.2 Summary of Dialogue with the Government and the Military

3.3 Dialogue with the Police

3.4 ’I Hope This is Helpful’

UK Nuclear Policy

Refusal To Divulge Information

The Government View on the Legality of Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent

The Nuremberg Responsibility of Serving Officers

References and Acknowledgements

3.1 Why Dialogue?

Dialogue and negotiation with the Government and other state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary, is seen as a very necessary part of the TP campaign. If there is any willingness at all, on the part of the British Government, to actually fulfil their international and humanitarian obligations by disarming Trident themselves, then we will not have to undertake this work ourselves and can stop our ploughshares actions.

We need to have dialogue to make sure that we are listening to the Government and state institutions and continually checking that our aims, objectives and actions remain appropriate within the changing circumstances.

We also need to apply the pressure of rational, logical discussion, to ask awkward questions, show up inconsistencies and hypocrisies, all the abuses which eventually develop in those holding power.

The dialogue of regular letters and contact backs up our active, practical disarmament work and keeps it alive and potent. We use the statistics of our growing support from Parliamentarians, Bishops, Professors and Organisations along with the growing number of TP Pledgers and their arrests and imprisonments to show our determination for nuclear disarmament.

The letters are often slow to be answered so we ask supporting MPs to write on our behalf to get decent replies, so our questions are not ignored. This keeps the MPs up to date with the arguments too. Often our questions are still unanswered, especially the really critical one of how exactly can a 100 kiloton warhead be used in a way capable of discriminating between a military target and civilians. We then get our MPs to ask questions in the House of Commons. These have yielded interesting replies (see Part 3.4).

Dialogue and resistance go hand in hand in order to create social and political change.

3.2 Summary of Dialogue with the Government and the Military

A group of independent advisors were consulted in the pre-launch months between February and May 1998. They helped us outline our strategy and draft the initial letter to Tony Blair. They remain in the wings ready to help us in any meetings and negotiations that may start in the future, and sometimes give advice. We agreed that we would be open for negotiation and dialogue throughout the whole project; that all disarmament actions would proceed as planned unless we received, from a person in authority, a written document agreeing to the complete disarmament of the Trident system. The basic trade-off being that the Government does the disarmament or we do it. All Pledgers would be involved in deciding whether to accept any agreement that the Dialogue and Negotiation team managed to facilitate but the agreement would have to be within the spirit of the criteria set out in the box.

Approaches were made to Government officials and MPs and a meeting sought without success. On the 18th March 1998 a letter was sent to Prime Minister Tony Blair. It was the first in a long ongoing series of letters. A summary of this correspondence is printed below and some of the letters have been reproduced in full. The website keeps copies and is updated every few months. Link to copies here

3.3 Dialogue with the Police

3.4 ’I Hope This is Helpful’

An examination of the statements, questions and answers made in Parliament and letters from Government Ministries.

The title is a wry reference to the way many letters from Government offices end. It often comes after a complete brush-off to our queries. On the other hand, the letters are oddly useful. They allow us to hoist the nuclear establishment with its own petard, bearing in mind that a petard is a delayed fuse to a barrel of gunpowder which ignites prematurely and that ’hoist’ was originally a Dutch word meaning ’blow up’.

This analysis builds on Government replies to a relentless stream of letters from anti-nuclear activists, from Parliamentary Questions put by friendly MPs and from the Strategic Defence Review. It concentrates on the legality of Trident. The Government statements and letters tend to be very repetitive and so only a fraction of the material has been reproduced here. Similar information on other areas of interest such as the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention, the UK’s record in Nuclear Weapons Negotiations, and its policy on De-Alerting and No First Use can be sent to you if you want from George at the World Court Project.

The pattern consists of quotes from government material with commentary interspersed. There are four sections with some inevitable overlap. Sometimes only parts of documents have been reproduced, and at times one document appears under more than one section.

UK Nuclear Policy

Geoffrey Hoon, Minister of Defence, to Lord Murray, 3 November 1999.

’We believe that this combination of working for further progress in arms control with the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, while maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent in the current security circumstances, represents a coherent, moral and military sound contribution to British security.’

This sums up UK Government policy and repeats the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), para 60, of 8 July 1998.

’Trident is our only nuclear weapon. We need to ensure that it can remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years. This is why we need a force of four Trident submarines’ (SDR para 62).

Thus, the ’current security circumstances’ seem set fair for several decades. and even up to 2028, which will see many of us out - one way or another.

’...it would be premature to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident should this prove necessary.’ (SDR Supporting Essay, ’Deterrence, Arms Control, and Proliferation’, para 14).

Even to think this thought suggests that the government sees no real possibility of a world free of nuclear weapons. This is not just ’existential deterrence’ - mere possession. The SDR Supporting Essay Deterrence, Arms Control and Proliferation, para 13, says that,

’Consideration was given to more radical de-alerting measures, such as taking submarines off deterrent patrol, and removing warheads from their missiles and storing them separately ashore. Our work concluded, however, that neither step would be compatible in current circumstances with maintaining a credible minimum deterrent with a submarine-based nuclear system.’

One World Court Project Supporter pointed out that,

’The fate of humanity and possibly all life on Earth is therefore to be risked for this, the final, intransgressible justification for maintaining nuclear arsenals.’

This is certainly at odds with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996 Para 105 F:

’There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’

It sits ill with the promises Britain made when it accepted the Programme of Action at the NPT Review Conference in May 2000 and voted for the New Agenda Resolution in November 2000.

Stephen Willmer, Ministry of Defence, to Alan Wilkie, 20 April 2000.

’The maintenance of a minimum nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring the stability in which nuclear disarmament can become a reality is a sensible and honest policy, that meets both the Government’s immediate security and longer term goals.’

It is not clear how we can hope to achieve a nuclear-free world by maintaining and enhancing our preparations for nuclear war.

Refusal To Divulge Information

George Robertson, then Secretary of State for Defence to Austin Mitchell MP, 23 August 1999.

’Dear Austin

Thank you for your letter of 22 July 1999 requesting a meeting to discuss the legality of Trident.

I am afraid that such a meeting would serve little purpose. We have repeatedly made our position clear. We do not consider the possession or use of nuclear weapons as such to be illegal. Nor does our position conflict with the Opinion of the International Court of Justice. If the Court had thought that it was impossible to use nuclear weapons in accordance with international law, it would have said so.’

This is a classic brush-off. The delegation would have consisted of three Members of Parliament, and Lord Murray, a former Lord Advocate of Scotland. There is a complete refusal to discuss the matter, even with very well-informed and distinguished people, and with no real reason given - only bald assertions.

Alan Hughes, Ministry of Defence, to Sister Mary Lampard, 26th June 2000.

’As regards the yield of Trident nuclear warheads the Government’s position is not to comment. Such information is classified.’

The legal status of Trident depends on its effects and therefore its yield. Classified information is one more way of avoiding the legal issue.

Stephen Willmer, Ministry of Defence, to Angie Zelter, 2 March 2000.

’The threshold for legitimate use of nuclear weapons clearly is, and should be, a very high one... However, an action that is legal in one set of circumstances can be illegal in different circumstances. The Government continues to believe that there is no useful benefit to be gained from hypothetical speculation on where precisely the dividing line would lie. Nor does the Government believe that any conceptual planning on potential use of nuclear weapons carried out by the Ministry of Defence can reasonably be made open to public scrutiny. Secrecy in this area plays an important part in enabling the United Kingdom to maintain a credible minimum deterrent capability at the lowest possible level.’

The paragraph has to be looked at as a whole. It suggests that the ’conceptual planning’ involves legal criteria; and that these legal criteria themselves cannot be disclosed because they are essential to deterrence. So the legal thinking is classified as well. How can courts operate correctly under such restrictions? How can Trident disarmers know the limits of the law? This suspicion is confirmed by the Parliamentary exchange which follows.

Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 17 November - 21 December 1999, House of Commons, Written Questions, 13 Dec 1999: Column: 30W,

Nuclear Deterrence Policy.

Mr. Tony Benn: To ask the Solicitor-General what advice he has sought on the legality of British nuclear deterrence policy. [102132]

The Solicitor-General: ... As a matter of convention (observed by successive Governments) neither the substance of the Law Officers’ advice on a question, nor the fact that they have been consulted, is disclosed outside Government, other than in exceptional circumstances.

Mr. Tony Benn: To ask the Solicitor-General what representations he has received about permission for a private prosecution of those responsible within Government for infringements of international humanitarian law based on the Government’s nuclear deterrence policy. [102131]

... A request for permission for a private prosecution under the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 was received last year. However, the Law Officers take the view that the application of the Government’s nuclear deterrence policy does not involve an infringement of either domestic or international law, and accordingly permission was not given.

Of course, many such initiatives have been taken by nuclear resisters to bring private prosecutions. Here we have a little more insight into the thinking behind the relentless blocking of these over the years.

Douglas Henderson Minister of State for the Armed Forces to Nigel Waterson MP, in response to a letter from Leslie Dalton, 1 June 1999.

’Dear Nigel

... We are confident that the Opinion does not require a change in the UK’s or NATO’s entirely defensive nuclear deterrence policy. It follows that those who operate Trident submarines are acting legally under the Nuremberg Principles.

Any decision on the use of UK nuclear weapons would always be taken centrally by Ministers. Legal advice from the Government’s legal advisers was available to Ministers and senior officers and officials in considering within the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) the nuclear options we might need to have available to maintain a credible minimum deterrent throughout the life of Trident. Legal advice would also be available to Ministers if circumstances were extreme enough for us ever to have to consider the use of nuclear weapons to defend ourselves from attack. We are satisfied that our arrangements to ensure informed legal advice in such circumstances are fully adequate.’

This is an account, not very convincing, of how the legality of Trident was assessed for the Strategic Defence Review. We have not been able to discover what legal advice was given. The idea that considered legal advice would be available during a nuclear crisis beggars belief and has something in common with the Civil Defence advice of the 80’s.

The Government View on the Legality of Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent

John Spellar, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, to Alan Keen MP, in response to a letter from Joanna Bazley, 27 July 2000.

’In fact, the ICJ confirmed that the legality of the threat of use, or use, of nuclear weapons is governed by the same laws of war as determine the legality of any other form of weapons not specifically prohibited under international law. Such legality can only be determined in the light of the specific circumstances applying when such threat of use, or actual use, is being considered as an action that is legal in one set of circumstances may be illegal in different circumstances. The Government continues to believe that there is no useful benefit to be gained from hypothetical speculation on where precisely the dividing line might lie between circumstances where use is legal and those were it would be illegal...

In light of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, the Government continues to believe that its minimum nuclear deterrent is entirely consistent with international law. A public enquiry is therefore not necessary.’

Note that the Government uses the ICJ Opinion to argue its own case at the beginning and end of the above extract. This approach is repeated in several letters and statements. We therefore do not need to argue for the authority of the Opinion. The Government has done it for us.

However, two important issues are being evaded. The response misses the point. The government has never been asked for ’hypothetical speculation’, but for general legal guidelines. It has not been asked to explain the legality of ’nuclear weapons’ in general, but of Trident in particular.

Stephen Willmer, Ministry of Defence, to Geoffrey Carnall, 15 December 1999.

’The Government agrees entirely with the Court that a threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 is unlawful. Article 2(4) prohibits any use of force in a manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations...

Additionally, as the Court made clear, and as the United Kingdom argued in its evidence to the Court, the principles and rules of international humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons, as they do to all weapons...

The Government has made it clear that the United Kingdom would only consider using nuclear weapons in self defence and in extreme circumstances, and subject to the rules of international law, and humanitarian law, applicable in armed conflict...

However, the legality of any specific threat or use of force, including with nuclear weapons, can only be determined in the light of all the circumstances applying at the time. It is impossible to anticipate in advance with any confidence the exact circumstances which might arise, and the Government does not believe that speculation on particular hypothetical uses serves any useful purpose...’

This is the fullest explanation we have seen in a letter of the Government’s legal position. The refusal to speculate on the ’exact circumstances’ is a constant theme in the letters.

However, in the main it adopts a similar position to that of World Court Project UK and Trident Ploughshares - that nuclear weapons are subject to humanitarian law and that humanitarian law applies in all circumstances - that it is intransgressible.

Therefore the Government must accept our view that the Opinion, (para 86, 105, 2D) says that weapons which could not distinguish between civilian and military targets, would be unlawful; and that even if a nuclear response were proportionate to a threat or attack, it would still have to meet the requirements of humanitarian law. (Opinion para 42).

But there is a yawning gap. Nowhere is it explained how Trident could ever meet this exacting test. This is why we need a publicly accountable legal audit of Trident.

Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 10 January

House of Commons, Written Questions, Nuclear Weapons.

Mr Hoon ... The relevant section on Nuclear Weapons [of the Law of Armed Conflict for the Armed Services] ... reads:

’There is no specific rule of international law, express or implied, which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. The legality of their use depends upon the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the inherent right of self defence and the conduct of hostilities. Those rules cannot be applied in isolation from any factual context to imply a prohibition of a general nature. Whether the use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons in a particular case is lawful depends on all the circumstances. Nuclear weapons fall to be dealt with by reference to the same general principles as apply to conventional weapons...’

The Government phrase that ’Those rules cannot be applied in isolation from any factual context to imply a prohibition of a general nature’ is surely inconsistent with the determination from the Court ’that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law’.

Professor Francis Boyle comments that,

’This language is helpful. At least we can use it in any future anti-nuclear protest case in the UK. We would simply take the UK government statement at its word, and contextualize the particular nuclear weapons system in dispute. This is exactly what we successfully did at Greenock. We did not argue the illegality of nuclear weapons as an abstract proposition. Rather, we argued that the particular characteristics of the Trident 2 (targeting strategy, destructive power, casualties, deployment, command and control, etc.) made it criminal under international law.’

Peter Weiss (Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy) points out:

’... in articles 35 and 36 of the Opinion reference is made to the ’unique characteristics of nuclear weapons’, which ’render the nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic’ because, inter alia, its enormous destructive power ’cannot be contained in either space or time’. The third subparagraph of par. 35 deals with the effects of the radiation released by nuclear weapons on ’health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a wide area’. ’Ionizing radiation’, the Court says in this passage, ’has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystems, and to cause genetic defects and illnesses in future generations’. All of this would clearly be applicable to Trident 2 if anything were known about its characteristics.’

Peter Weiss also tackles the ’the inherent right of self defence’ referred to by the Minister. In par. 41, the ICJ quotes from the Nicaragua case the generally accepted principle that ’self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it.’ But it then goes on to say, in par. 42:

’The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’

To put it colloquially, Show me a nuclear weapon and I will show you a weapon that violates humanitarian law, so don’t talk to me about self-defence or, for that matter, necessity.

However, it may be claimed that the UK Trident system has a sub-strategic role, in which some missiles are fitted with maybe only a single, lower yield warhead.

C H J Davies, Ministry of Defence, to Liz Waterston, 27 October 1998.

’A sub-strategic capability is an essential element in ensuring that no nuclear-armed aggressor could gamble on us being self-deterred from crossing the nuclear threshold in extreme circumstances of self-defence by fear of an inevitable strategic exchange. In such circumstances this capability would allow the limited use of nuclear weapons to send an aggressor a political message of the Alliance’s resolve to defend itself. The UK has a degree of flexibility in the choice of yield for the warheads on its Trident missiles.’

It is quite likely that this sub-strategic capacity comprises the first stage of a normal 100 kiloton warhead with a yield of ’only’ one kiloton or thereabouts. Even this is an enormous explosion, equivalent to about 35 container trucks of TNT parked outside a busy court. This would still spread lethal radiation and cause indiscriminate deaths. However, the main point to make is that even if the Trident warheads can be used in this way, they are still capable of yielding 100 kilotons and are therefore subject to the legal arguments applying to such monsters of destruction.

Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 10 January

House of Commons, Written Questions, Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what assessment his Department has carried out of the long-term effects of a 100 kiloton Trident on a military target; [104074] (2) what assessment his Department has carried out of the effects of a 100 kiloton Trident warhead detonation on the civilian population living near military targets. [104073]

Mr. Hoon: The Trident missiles on which our nuclear deterrent is based have been de-targeted since 1994. Our judgement of the minimum level of deterrence required is supported by comprehensive computer modelling which enables us to assess the effects of nuclear detonations. A number of factors are taken into account in this assessment. As Lord Robertson made clear to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) on 4 February 1998, Official Report, column 655W, these include the yield and design of the weapon used; the accuracy of the delivery system employed; the nature and construction of the target; the characteristics of the surrounding terrain; the height of the detonation; and geological and weather conditions. I am withholding information on UK nuclear warhead yield under Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information, relating to defence, security and international relations.

The ’number of factors taken into account in this assessment’ do not include the crucial one - the likely effects on the civilian population. Without this, and the fact that information on Trident’s yield is withheld, neither we, nor the lawyers advising the government can make a legal assessment of any likely use.

Stephen Willmer, Ministry of Defence, to George Farebrother, 10 September 1999.

’It is of course also true, as you say, that the general principles of international humanitarian law are incorporated in English and Scottish law. I appreciate that you believe that the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent is in breach of those principles, and that you therefore consider action to oppose it legally justified. The Government strongly supports the right of anyone to demonstrate peacefully and in accordance with the law in support of causes in which they believe. However, as you know, the Government is confident that Trident is consistent with international law, and that the personnel involved in its operation and support are acting entirely legally. Unless the British Courts were to find otherwise, the civil police and Service personnel are therefore equally obliged at law to prevent unauthorised access to private property and controlled defence facilities...’

Again, the first sentence would be completely in agreement with the WCP UK and Trident Ploughshares view. The last sentence should be stored in our collective memory for future use. Perhaps it all depends what you mean by ’Unless the British Courts were to find otherwise...’

Stephen Parkinson of the Attorney General’s Office to Andrew Gray, 7 January 2000.

’The Attorney General does not share your view that legal questions have been raised about nuclear weapons in general, or the Trident system in particular, such as to justify investigation. The Government is confident that the UK’s minimum nuclear deterrent is compatible with its obligations under international law.’

The only known letter from the Attorney General. Very brisk. We must look out for future developments whichare ’such as to justify investigation’. At least he doesn’t end with ’I hope this is helpful’.

GeoffreyHoon, Minister of Defence, to Lord Murray, 3 November 1999.

’At the same time, we are working to remove the risk of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons worldwide, while maintaining a robust defensive capability to protect British interests in the event of their use.

We would only ever use our nuclear weapons in self-defence and in extreme circumstances.’

There are many questions here. The claim is that NWs are only for use in extreme circumstances. What these consist of is never made clear. The paragraph suggests that they could be used to deter chemical or biological threats, or even to protect British ’interests’ - far short of the ’extreme circumstances’ mentioned, and certainly disproportionate. The government refuses to clarify this, in spite of repeated requests to do so. It has never defined exactly what is meant by ’British interests’.

The Nuremberg Responsibility of Serving Officers

Douglas Henderson Minister of State for the Armed Forces to Nigel Waterson MP, in response to a letter from Leslie Dalton, 1 June 1999.

’We are confident that the opinion does not require a change in the UK’s or NATO’s entirely defensive nuclear deterrence policy. It follows that those who operate Trident submarines are acting legally under the Nuremberg Principles.’

The implication about the Nuremberg Principles is bald and unfounded. However, we are assured that training in international law actually takes place:

House of Commons, Written Questions, 20 Dec 1999: Column: 362W, Training (International Law).

Mr. Drew: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on what training is provided for (a) officers and (b) other ranks, on understanding international law. [103228]

Mr. Spellar: Training in aspects of international law, and specifically in the ’Law of Armed Conflict’, is provided to both officers and other ranks of all three services as part of initial basic training, in accordance with the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Further training in international law, again covering the legitimacy of military operations and on the conduct of waging war, is provided on a wide range of specialist training courses, on both a single service and joint service basis. Furthermore, additional training and briefings relating to relevant international law, are normally provided to formed units of all three services by legal specialists prior to operational deployment.

So we must assume that officers serving on Trident submarines know that the Nuremberg Principles apply to them and that any illegal order to fire must be disobeyed. According to the following, the basic guidance comes from the ’Law of Armed Conflict for the Armed Services’ which is to be updated late in 2000.

Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 10 January

House of Commons, Written Questions, Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will make a statement on the application of the Nuremberg Principles to military personnel ordered to use, or to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons;[104075]

(2) what measures he has taken to make military personnel who operate Trident aware of their obligations under international law since the International Court of Justice delivered its Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons; [104076]

Mr Hoon: ...The relevant section on Nuclear Weapons [of the Law of Armed Conflict for the Armed Services] was reconfirmed following the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that the section on Nuclear Weapons was reconfirmed suggests that the Advisory Opinion had no impact on the Government’s legal thinking or on legal advice it gave to Trident submariners. However, the following interchange does suggest a lack of serious thinking on which to base this advice:

Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 10 January

House of Commons, Written Questions, Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had, and with whom, on the application of international humanitarian law to the use of Trident. [104072]

Mr. Hoon: I have had no specific discussions on the application of international humanitarian law to the use of Trident. The United Kingdom’s minimum nuclear deterrent is consistent with international law.

Mr. Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what information senior officers on Trident submarines are given on the specific yields and likely targets of the missiles they are responsible for. [104077]

Mr. Hoon: The Trident missiles on which our nuclear deterrent is based have been de-targeted since 1994. In the circumstances, of our having to use our nuclear weapons, members of the patrolling submarine crew would be provided with the information they need to discharge their duties. I am withholding the details of this information under Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information relating to defence, security and international relations.

This is serious. As there has been ’no specific discussions on the application of international humanitarian law to the use of Trident’, how can serving officers be advised properly about their Nuremberg responsibilities - bearing in mind that international law must be applied to Trident itself rather than to nuclear weapons in general?

The fact that the weapons have been ’de-targeted’ is a cloak. We know that they can be re-targeted very quickly (’We will, however, ensure that we can restore a higher state of alert should this become necessary at any time’ SDR para 68). The computer plans must still be there. Do the relevant officers even know the targets or do they fire blind? Would they know the necessary details to enable them to be able to judge if their acts would be responsible even after they had been ’provided with the information they need to discharge their duties’ if given an order to fire? It seems unlikely, given the apparent lack of assessment of the effects of Trident warheads on civilians living in target areas, that they would have enough information to consider their Nuremberg obligations in a time of crisis. They would be allowed, by default, to become war criminals.

References and Acknowledgements

3.1 Dialogue and Negotiation Team

A Summary of Dialogue and Negotiation Work of TP2000 - Angie Zelter 2000.

The Strategic Defence Review - CND Submission, William Peden, June 1997.

Taking Nuclear Forces off Alert - Commander Robert Green.

3.2 Summary of Dialogue with the Government and the Military

Copies of all letters can be received from the core group, and many of them are stored on our website.

3.4 ’I Hope This is Helpful’

This section was written by George Farebrother, November 2000. He and the World Court Project can be contacted for further information (see ’Useful Addresses’, Part 10).

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